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Abstract
Over recent years there has been increasing interest in personal gain as a threat to the validity of 
neuropsychological testing. As a result, clinicians have begun to use specialist measures in an 
attempt to identify how much ‘effort’ a person is putting in and therefore whether they may be 
feigning or exaggerating their difficulties. Such effort tests have become commonplace within a 
medico-legal context and their use is also increasing within clinical settings. However, thorough 
investigation of the performance and classification accuracy of such measures is limited and 
questions have been raised regarding the rates of false positives in clinical populations.
Assessing how people with genuine injuries perform on effort tests is critical for the valid 
interpretation of test scores, as clinicians have a duty of care not to label people as having a 
brain injury if they are malingering, or diagnosing someone as malingering when they have a 
genuine brain injury or are legitimately unwell. Therefore, the current thesis investigated the 
base rates of failure on a number of effort tests in a genuinely brain-injured population with no 
identifiable incentives to feign in order to provide further evaluation of the measures. The main 
focus was on the Word Memory Test, as the author claims that this measure is “virtually 
insensitive to all but the most extreme forms of impairment of learning and memory” (Green, 
Lees-Haley & Allen, 2002, p. 99).
A total of 47 participants were recruited to the study, including 20 people in residential 
community rehabilitation services, 16 outpatients with intractable epilepsy, and 11 people in 
post-acute inpatient rehabilitation. Each participant was administered a battery of tests, 
including measures of effort, pre-morbid IQ, memory, speed of processing, and mood.
Analyses of pass/fail rates across effort tests indicated that the rates of false positives within a 
genuine clinical sample with no incentive to feign were much higher than those proposed within 
the validation research of the tests. In addition, further statistical analyses identified a number of 
factors that contributed to scores on tests in addition to effort. Relationships with these factors 
varied depending on the particular effort test being assessed, with significant associations being 
identified with memory, depression, processing speed, age and participant subgroup.
These findings are consistent with recent research that suggests people with genuine brain 
injuries can fail effort tests for reasons related to ability rather than effort The implications for 
clinical assessment and intervention are discussed, and potential future research is suggested.
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1INTRODUCTION
"We must look fo r consistency. Where there is a want o f it we must suspect deception. "
Sherlock Holmes in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s (1927) 
"The Problem of Thor Bridge"
1.1 Overview
It is well established within the neuropsychological literature that there are many possible 
threats to the validity of neuropsychological testing in addition to trauma and disease, such as 
pain, medication, age, and educational level (e.g. Heaton, Grant & Mathews, 1986; Lishman, 
1997). This means that a neuropsychologist’s evaluation of any one individual might not give a 
wholly accurate profile of cognitive functioning, and it may be difficult to disentangle current 
difficulties from pre-morbid dispositions. However, more importantly, over the past 15 years 
there has been increasing interest in the potential for personal gain as a threat to validity and the 
impact that effort can have on test performance (e.g. Bender & Rodgers, 2004; Bianchini, 
Mathias, & Greve, 2001; Lynch, 2004). This means that there may be an advantage to 
‘underperforming’ on tests for personal gain such as financial reimbursement, and research now 
indicates rates of up to 40% for malingering of symptoms in mild traumatic brain injury 
litigation (Larrabee, 2003).
For the interpretation of neuropsychological tests to be valid the examinee has to put in their 
best effort and give an accurate portrayal of symptoms, otherwise clinicians risk making a Type 
I error and concluding that someone has been legitimately injured when this is not the case. To 
make a determination about the validity of neuropsychological testing and to be confident in the 
accuracy of results and interpretations, clinicians are increasingly including specialist measures 
of ‘effort’ within their battery of tests.
Significant advances have been made in the field of assessment and identification of people who 
are potentially feigning their injuries, with the measures used to specifically assess how much 
‘effort’ a person is putting in supposedly being insensitive to cognitive ability (Green, 2003). 
Such tests are designed to appear complex, but are actually so simple that even people with 
severe impairments can pass them. Therefore, if people fail it suggests that they are not putting 
in their best effort rather than failure being the result of legitimate injury.
The use of tests to assess effort (commonly known as symptom validity or effort tests) has now 
become commonplace within a medico-legal framework, and some researchers have even 
suggested that effort should be assessed in all neuropsychological research (Green et al., 2002).
However, thorough investigation of the performance and classification accuracy of such 
measures is still limited, and there are ongoing questions regarding the procedures and measures 
used.
To date, the majority of the literature has understandably focussed on populations in which 
malingering is thought to be most prevalent, such as medico-legal settings. However, the 
importance of understanding the effort test performance of clinical populations with no 
incentives to feign is being recognised as vital for the valid interpretation of test scores, and 
research has begun to consider whether people with genuine injuries fail these tests at higher 
rates than previously thought for reasons other than effort. The limited research conducted with 
clinical populations has shown that false positive results are a real difficulty that measures need 
to overcome if they are to be viewed as valid for use (Merten, Bossink & Schmand, 2006).
The main aim of the current thesis is to investigate the base rates of failure on a number of effort 
tests in a clinical population with genuine injuries and no identifiable incentives to feign in 
order to provide further evaluation of the measures. The main focus will be rates of failure on 
the Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, 2003), as the author of the WMT claims that this 
measure is “virtually insensitive to all but the most extreme forms of impairment of learning and 
memory” (Green et al., 2002, p. 99).
The following section first provides information regarding the definitions, diagnostic criteria 
and prevalence rates of malingering, then goes on to consider the various ways that the feigning 
and exaggerating of symptoms has been researched. Following this, effort testing is evaluated as 
the main way of identifying malingering, and an overview of how such effort tests are designed 
and evaluated is provided. A critique of the current research is then presented, with a specific 
focus on the WMT, followed by the justification of the current research and methodology. 
Finally, the aims of the research are outlined.
1.2 Definition and Diagnosis of Malingering
When being assessed by professionals people may display particular response styles depending 
on the circumstances; both internal and external influences affect the reporting of information, 
and all individuals vary regarding how much and the type of information they disclose to others 
(Rogers, 2008a). In an attempt to operationalise the basic concepts and definitions of response 
styles Rogers (2008a) has proposed the four main categories of non-specific terms, overstated 
pathology, simulated adjustment and other styles. These terms will be used throughout the 
current research. Overstated pathology is the most relevant to the current research and will
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therefore be discussed initially, with the alternative response styles being outlined in section 
1.2.3.
Rogers (2008a) recommends the use of three terms for discussing what he describes as 
overstated pathology, including ‘Malingering’, ‘Factitious Presentations’ and ‘Feigning’. The 
DSM-IV defines malingering as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated 
physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000, p739). Therefore, isolated symptoms or minor exaggeration are not enough 
to attract such a diagnosis. The definition encompasses the faking or exaggeration of symptoms 
from a wide range of disorders; including cognitive disorders such as amnesia, physical 
disorders such as pain, and psychiatric conditions such as dissociative disorders. Under this 
definition, malingering could involve someone feigning a memory impairment to gain 
compensation, dissociation to avoid a prison sentence, or pain to obtain drugs. Currently, the 
most common fabricated deficits appear to be with cognitive disorders (Cercy, Schrellen & 
Brandt, 1997).
However, other conditions are often associated with malingering, and can be differentiated by 
the underlying motivation and conscious awareness of symptom production. For a diagnosis of 
malingering to be given, factitious presentations need to be ruled out. For example, the DSM-IV 
(APA, 2000) definition of factitious disorder states that although the motivation is intentional, it 
is differentiated by the nature of the secondary gain, which is the psychological need to assume 
a sick role. However, researchers have also argued that these definitions are not clear. Rogers, 
Jackson and Kaminski (2004) point out that being a patient usually results in a change to 
people’s responsibilities in relation to family and work, and exaggeration has also been 
proposed as a ‘cry for help’ to ensure recognition of distress (Berry et al., 1996).
The concept of ‘Feigning’ has also been suggested as appropriate to describe the deliberate 
exaggeration or fabrication of symptoms where no assumptions are made regarding the goals. 
This term was introduced because of the lack of ability for standardised tests to assess the 
underlying motivations of performance at assessment. Therefore, according to Rogers (2008a), 
psychological tests cannot be used to establish malingering, but they can be used to establish 
feigning.
As a result of the difficulties with acceptable definitions some researchers have concluded that 
“malingering behaviour should not be thought of as a dichotomy, but rather as a continuum that 
ranges from purposeful conscious deception to involuntary unconscious psychogenic deficits” 
(Haines & Norris, 1995, p i27). The National Academy of Neuropsychology (NAN) has 
recently produced a position paper that supports this assertion, stating that “Invalid responding
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or performance is not a dichotomous phenomenon. Examinees may vary their performance 
along a continuum from complete effort and honesty to a complete lack thereof.” (Bush, Ruff, 
Troster, Barth, Koffler, Pliskin, Reynolds, & Silver, 2005, p422). In line with this, Rogers 
(1997; 2008a) proposes moving away from the criminological model of explaining the 
underlying motivations of malingering used in the DSM-IV criteria to one based on adaptation. 
Such a predicted utility model is based upon how useful the individual believes the response 
style to be and a consideration of the potential risks and benefits in any given situation.
Slick, Sherman and Iverson (1999) have proposed diagnostic criteria for malingering, where the 
presence of intent is inferred rather than specifically assessed. The Slick et al. (1999) guidelines 
for the diagnosis of ‘malingered neurocognitive dysfunction’ (MND) involve three distinct 
categories; the first is ‘definite’ (characterised by the identification of an external incentive and 
definite negative response bias, such as below-chance performance on two or more forced- 
choice effort tests); the second is ‘probable’ (including the identification of external incentives 
and two or more failures on effort tests or one effort test failure and one self-reported 
noncredible symptom or test data discrepancy, excluding below chance performance on forced 
choice tests); and the third is ‘possible’ (which includes an identified external incentive plus 
self-report information that is discrepant with findings). Slick et al. (1999) also state that where 
psychiatric, developmental or neurologic factors ‘fully account’ for the findings then a diagnosis 
of malingering should not be given. However, professionals have questioned how to decide 
whether such factors ‘fully account’ for performance on tests, and how to determine whether the 
person’s behaviour is truly volitional (Boone, 2007). Research indicates that brain injury, 
learning disability and psychological conditions such as depression cannot account for poor 
performance on some effort tests (e.g. Boone, Lu & Herzberg, 2002; Goldberg, Back-Madruga 
& Boone, 2007; Tombaugh, 1996), although this data varies depending on the test in question 
and the clinical samples used in the research.
The National Academy of Neuropsychology position paper concludes that “When the potential 
for secondary gain increases the incentive for symptom exaggeration or fabrication and/or when 
neuropsychologists become suspicious of insufficient effort or inaccurate or incomplete 
reporting, neuropsychologists can, and must, utilize symptom validity tests and procedures to 
assist in the determination of the validity of the information and test data obtained” (Bush et al. 
2005, pp425-426). As a result, if questionable response styles are observed then interpretation of 
performance on other tests as valid would need to be justified. The NAN guidelines also state 
that tests of effort with the best psychometric properties should be used, and that data from tests 
should be given substantially more weight than subjective indicators because of their 
objectivity. However, although the NAN position paper has provided some guidelines there is 
still no gold-standard to assess the construct of effort (Halligan, Bass & Oakley, 2003), and
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there is continuing debate over the terms and definitions that should be used (Boone, 2007), 
which has made it difficult to establish how best to evaluate this area.
Therefore, the purpose of the current thesis is to consider the applicability and generalisability 
of effort tests which aim to identify feigning in brain injury, and to evaluate their performance 
in non-litigating clinical populations. If effort tests are fit for purpose then there should be very 
low base rates of failure in people with no incentive to feign.
1.2.1 Prevalence rates
Problems with the definition of malingering, the difficulties identifying true malingerers and the 
lack of appropriate diagnostic criteria have all affected prevalence estimates. However, a 
number of studies have attempted to provide base rates for a variety of conditions and settings, 
including forensic, psychiatric, health, and cognitive assessment. Following this, it is now 
widely accepted that a proportion of people do exaggerate symptoms during assessment, 
particularly within medico-legal settings.
Prevalence estimates have often been based on clinical judgement and opinion. For example 
Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, and Condit (2002) conducted a survey of the American Board of 
Clinical Neuropsychology, and identified probable malingering and symptom exaggeration in 
29% of personal injury claimants, 30% of disability claimants, 19% of criminal cases, and 8% 
of general medical cases. The highest base rate was identified in mild traumatic brain injury 
(TBI) personal injury litigants, with reports ranging from 38.5%-41.2%, and an 8% base rate for 
clinical cases with no apparent external incentives. Other research also supports these findings 
(Slick, Tan, Strauss, & Hultch, 2004; Sharland & Gfeller, 2007). For example, Sharland and 
Gfeller’s (2007) survey of 188 neuropsychologists found that the median estimate of deliberate 
exaggeration or feigning in civil litigation was 20%, which was four times higher than those not 
involved in litigation, although the range of estimates varied widely, ranging from 0-90% for 
both contexts.
In relation to population studies, a review conducted by Larrabee (2003) concluded that there 
was an overall base rate of 40% exaggerating or feigning symptoms in a sample of 1363 mild 
TBI litigants. Whilst a meta-analysis of factors moderating outcome in mild TBI also identified 
that people not in litigation recovered within three months of injury, whereas those in litigation 
continued to report symptoms or got worse over time (Belanger, Curtis, & Demery, 2005). In 
forensic criminal settings, Ardolf, Denney and Houston (2007) investigated base rates of 
malingering with 105 defendants. Based on the Slick et al. (1999) criteria, 19% were identified 
as putting in a valid performance, 26.7% were identified as ‘possible’, 32.4% were ‘probable’,
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and 21.9% were ‘definite’ malingers. The combined rates of probable and definite malingerers 
were therefore 54.3% within this forensic setting. Richman, Green and Gervais (2006) also 
found that 42% of 106 potential disability claimants undergoing medical examination failed 
effort testing. Whilst social security claims studies have also identified a combined 
probable/defmite rate of 72.4% (Chafetz & Abrahams, 2005).
1.2.2 Illustrative case of malingering
As an example of malingering within the context of traumatic brain injury, Mittenberg and 
Morgan (2009) report the case of Ms. C, a 50 year old woman who sustained head trauma five 
years prior to assessment by a neuropsychologist. No loss of consciousness or hospitalisation 
was noted, Post Traumatic Amnesia was less than 24 hours, MRI brain scan was normal, and 
she was able to walk home after the accident. All of which indicate a mild head injury, in which 
symptoms do not usually persist beyond three months (Binder, Rohling & Larrabee, 1997; 
Schretlen & Shapiro, 2003)
Psychological testing at six months and two years post-accident was at the level of severe 
cognitive impairment in intelligence and memory, and Ms. C reported inability to return to work 
due to cognitive difficulties, very poor concentration, poor sense of direction and loss of ability 
to read or play music. However, all of the findings were inconsistent with the sustained level of 
head trauma, and even patients with profound amnesia do not forget how to play music.
The neuropsychological report six months post injury recommended that Ms. C attend cognitive 
rehabilitation for post-concussion syndrome and post traumatic stress disorder, but this was not 
taken up. A 25-point discrepancy was identified between General Memory and 
Attention/Concentration Indexes, but since it is not possible to remember information that is not 
paid attention to initially then this corresponds to a 90% or above chance that this was a 
malingered memory impairment (Mittenberg, Puentes, Patton, Canyock & Heilbronner, 2002).
Two years after injury Ms. C was assessed again as part of a disability benefits claim. This 
assessment was performed by a nurse with no qualifications in psychology. Ms. C again scored 
in the severe range on general IQ tests, problem solving and motor functions, which were again 
highly inconsistent with what would be expected in mild head injury. In addition, she scores 
6/30 on the Seashore Rhythm test, in which patients must indicate if each of 30 pairs of tonal 
sequences are the same or different. A person who was unable to perform this test would score 
50% just by guessing, so the application of the Binomial Theorem indicates a 99.9% chance that 
Ms. C’s score of 20% correct is reflective of the fact that she knew the right answers, but 
deliberately chose the wrong answers. However, the nurse reported the findings as indicating
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global cognitive decline and recommended 12 months of rehabilitation and restriction of 
activities.
Additional information that questioned the veracity of Ms. C’s claims was also identified in 
discrepancies in reported educational level. Ms. C had reported she had an Undergraduate 
Social Work degree in one examination and a Postgraduate Degree in Law in the other 
examination, neither of which were found to be the case. A review of medical records also 
indicated that she had filed a compensation claim ten years earlier in which the results of an 
orthopaedic examination suggested that Ms. C may be exaggerating her symptoms.
Further medicolegal assessment of Ms. C by a neuropsychologist indicated that she was alert 
and oriented to person, place and time, affect was normal, behaviour was appropriate, and she 
was able to provide detailed accounts of past events, all of which are inconsistent with severe 
head trauma and memory dysfunction. Her scores on the Word Memory Test (Green, 2003) 
were significantly lower than people with severe brain injury (WMT-Immediate Recognition 
Trial = 42.5, Delayed Recognition Trial = 45). Scores on the Portland Digit Recognition Test 
(PDRT; Binder, 1993) and the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996), which 
are similar to the Word Memory Test in construction, again showed intentional production of 
incorrect answers below the level expected for guessing. Her scores on the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale-Ill (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997a) also indicated that she was lower than 96% 
of the population, which again was inconsistent with presentation and observation. Scores on 
the Wechsler Memory Scale-Ill (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997b) also showed profound 
impairment, and people who have scores at this level require constant supervision and someone 
to manage their daily affairs. Ms. C again showed the intentional production of wrong answers 
on the Faces subtest of the WMS-III.
Overall, Ms. C presented with symptoms that were significantly disproportionate to the injury 
she had sustained, her symptoms did not match a known disorder, prior medical history 
indicated symptom exaggeration, inconsistency was noted in her autobiographical details, and 
her performance on tests suggested deliberate fabrication of symptoms. Ms. C’s ability to recall 
was better than her ability to recognise, she intentionally gave the wrong answers, and 
fabrication was indicated across multiple independent measures. Ms. C. therefore satisfied the 
Slick et al. (1999) criteria for ‘definite’ malingering.
The above case illustrates the importance of objective measurement of effort for identifying 
people who may be malingering their deficits as a result of external incentives. Ms. C had 
received numerous assessments, taking up the limited time and resources of a number of 
doctors, and had received significant financial assistance through the benefits system. If this
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woman had not been identified as malingering then she would have been awarded a substantial 
amount of compensation and continued to receive help and care that she was not entitled to and 
which would benefit someone who was genuinely in need.
The literature as a whole suggests that malingering does occur with relative frequency among 
litigants and criminal defendants, and the example presented above shows that clinicians need to 
take steps to ensure they are attempting to detect malingering where present and rule it out when 
it is not (Sweet, 1999; Sweet, Condit & Nelson, 2008). However, there is very limited research 
regarding prevalence rates in clinical populations with no obvious incentives. Ruling out 
feigning when the person has a genuine injury is dependent upon the clinician knowing what the 
performance of genuine patients looks like on tests of effort and whether there are any 
alternative reasons which might explain the results. If a judgment of feigning was made when 
the person actually had a legitimate injury then this could have significant consequences for the 
individual in relation to their rehabilitation and future quality of life.
1.2.3 Additional response styles
Rogers (2008a) provided more definitions of response styles in addition to those concerned with 
overstated pathology. Specifically, Rogers (2008a) suggests several non-specific terms for use 
by practitioners to avoid the over-specification of response styles when evidence is limited. 
Where the clinical data is conflicting or inconclusive, Rogers (2008a) suggests the use of 
several terms. ‘Unreliablity’ is suggested where there are questions about the accuracy of 
information reported, but no indication about intent or the reasons underlying it. 
‘Nondisclosure’ is used to describe a situation where the person omits to report information, 
again with no assumption about underlying motives, and ‘Self-disclosure’ is where the person 
chooses what information to disclose, and therefore a lack of self-disclosure does not reflect 
dishonesty. ‘Deception’ includes any consequential attempts to deceive through distortion or 
misrepresentation, and is often accompanied by nondisclosure, but is not evidence of 
malingering. Finally, ‘Dissimulation’ can be used to refer to anyone who deliberately attempts 
to misrepresent or distort psychological symptoms, but are otherwise difficult to classify as a 
response style.
Rogers (2008a) presents three terms used to describe response styles linked to Simulated 
Adjustment; including ‘Defensiveness’, ‘Social Desirability’ and ‘Impression Management’. 
‘Defensiveness’ refers to the deliberate masking and minimisation of symptoms, and can be 
viewed as the opposite of malingering. ‘Social desirability’ involves the presentation of the self 
in a favourable manner through the denial of negative characteristics and attribution of positive 
characteristics (Carsky, Selzer, Terkelson & Hurt, 1992), and ‘Impression Management’ refers
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to deliberate attempts to control others’ perceptions, and the reasons can range from the 
projection of a desired identity to the maximisation of social outcomes (Leary & Kowalski, 
1990).
Additional response styles have also been defined, but they are not as well understood. 
‘Irrelevant Responding’ is where the individual is not engaged in the assessment and provides 
responses that are not necessarily linked to the questions being asked. Linked to this is ‘Random 
Responding’ where the individual responds purely on chance factors, such as ticking the third 
choice on every item on a long questionnaire. For ‘Role Assumption’ the individual may 
assume the role of a character in order to respond, and ‘Hybrid Responding’ is used to describe 
the use of a variety of response styles when being assessed.
Although the above definitions are useful to consider when discussing response styles during 
neuropsychological testing, the definitions that are most relevant to the current research involve 
the feigning or exaggeration of symptoms. Much research has gone into the design and 
evaluation of tests with the purpose of identifying feigning. However, problems have been 
identified with the designs of such studies, and therefore the results and conclusions that can be 
drawn from them. The main research designs commonly used are discussed below.
1.2.4 Research designs used to identify malingering
Four main research designs have been used to investigate malingering performance on effort 
tests. These include simulation designs, known-groups comparisons, differential prevalence, and 
bootstrapping.
Simulation designs. Simulation studies are the most common approach. They typically involve 
asking non-injured participants to feign cognitive deficits in order to receive a reward, and then 
performance is compared to compensation seeking or non-litigating patients. However, such 
designs have been criticised for the performance of simulators not being generalisable to real- 
world malingerers (Henry, 2005), that the strategies they use are not the same (Gunstad & Suhr, 
2001), litigants are more informed about cognitive deficits than simulators (Strauss, Slick, 
Levy-Bencheton, Hunter, MacDonald, & Hultsch, 2002) and the incentives are not as large 
(Bauer & McCaffrey, 2006). However, they do have the advantages of internal validity due to 
experimental control (Inman & Berry, 2002).
Known-eroups designs. Known-groups approaches compare a non-litigating clinical group with 
a group independently identified as probable malingerers. The internal validity of this design is 
weak due to lack of experimental control. However, external validity is increased because the
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participants and the situations they are in are usually reflective of real-world experiences. The 
Slick et al. (1999) criteria have been used in many recent studies, although this design is still 
underused in current research and there are questions about the inaccurate assignment of 
participants to groups (Rogers, 2008a). For example, the assignment to known groups based on 
the Slick criteria is dependent upon the sensitivity and specificity of the various measures used 
to assess dissimulation. If the base rates for passing and failing the tests are derived from limited 
data then assignment to categories could be spurious. In addition, due to the difficulties with 
previously identifying adequate groups in known-groups designs, alternative differential 
prevalence and bootstrapping designs have also been used in research.
Differential prevalence designs. Differential prevalence studies involve a comparison of scores 
between two groups, where one sample is assumed to engage in the response style more than 
another. For example, it is assumed that differences in the type of referral can be used to 
identify groups, with those in litigation being more likely to feign. However, a major problem 
with this type of research is the researcher does not know which patients are actually feigning, 
and therefore cannot be sure if the findings are false positives (Rogers, 2008a). Differential 
prevalence designs frequently confound litigation status with malingering, and although the 
majority of research based on this design does show differential rates of failing, Ross, Putnam 
and Adams (2006) did not find this pattern, instead showing that litigation status was not related 
to incomplete effort. The percentage of people scoring below cutoff for effort who were in 
litigation (20%) being no higher than people not in litigation (18%; .26, p  = .61).
Bootstrapping designs. Finally, bootstrapping studies involve using previously well validated 
measures to classify groups into feigners and genuine injuries. Multiple measures are used in
order to maximise specificity and ensure that no genuine patients are identified as malingerers,
!
whilst at the same time maintaining reasonable sensitivity. However, problems with this strategy 
include generalisability from tests based on memory to the feigning of other difficulties, and 
conclusions are again dependent on the nature of the groups used in the validation studies.
In summary, research into malingering is complicated by diagnostic and methodological issues. 
Differential prevalence designs are commonplace in effort test research, and form the basis of 
many validation studies, but have significant limitations that can affect the conclusions drawn. 
Of crucial importance when conducting any research or assessment of malingering are the 
identified base rates of failure in clinical samples with no incentive to feign in order to avoid the 
mis identification of people with legitimate injuries as malingering, rather than reliance on the 
differential prevalence rates of those in litigation.
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1.3 Effort Testing
Although the base rates reported above vary depending on the context and sample, they provide 
an indication that many people may be feigning or exaggerating symptoms, suggesting the 
economic burden of such false claims could be substantial. Within the UK, the potential impact 
on limited National Health Service resources warrants continuing research into this area. In 
addition to the economic implications of feigning, there are also clinical considerations that 
must be taken into account. If feigning cannot be accurately identified then this may prevent or 
delay treatment for those genuinely in need. A label of malingering is also highly pejorative, 
and wrongful accusation or diagnosis can have a wide ranging impact on the individual and 
their life, including the withdrawal of needed treatment. In addition, clinicians may be liable for 
litigation proceedings if they get the diagnosis wrong, and may fear retribution from patients 
and families as well as damage to their professional reputation. All of these considerations 
highlight the need for accurate methods of detection and the importance of such accuracy for 
patients, clinicians, and society as a whole.
1.3.1 Evaluating effort measures
The difficulty differentiating between genuine and feigned illness has been highlighted in 
numerous studies. In the classic study by Rosenhan (1973) eight people feigning 
psychopathology were admitted to mental institutions and were not identified by medical staff 
as healthy. In addition, empirical research into the subjective judgements of clinicians regarding 
the validity of examinee symptoms has consistently found such judgements to be inaccurate 
(Faust, Guilmette, Hart, Artes, Fishbume & Davey, 1988) and unreliable for identifying 
malingering (van Gorp et al., 1999).
The ability of a test to differentiate between people with and without a particular condition is 
known as diagnostic validity (Smith, Cerhan, & Ivnik, 2003), and is dependent upon 
classification accuracy statistics, including sensitivity, specificity, and predictive power (Glaros 
& Kline, 1988; Grimes & Schulz, 2005). Such statistics are vital to the development of any 
measures designed to assess effort.
Sensitivity is the probability of a person with a particular impairment/response style being 
correctly identified, such as a positive test result in those who are malingering, and Specificity is 
the probability of a negative test result in those who are not malingering (i.e. those with genuine 
brain injury and no incentive to feign). Distributions of scores overlap for those with and 
without the condition, therefore there is no one cut-off point which perfectly separates them and 
a range of sensitivity and specificity values exist for various cut-offs. A review by Vickery,
Berry, Inman, Harris, and Orey (2001) of the diagnostic research on malingering revealed that 
the average sensitivity was .56 and specificity was .96, with an average hit rate (overall 
diagnostic power) of .77. This is characteristic of most effort tests, with specificity set high to 
minimise false-positives and avoiding mis identification of people who are not malingering, but 
this impacts on sensitivity and increases the rate of false-negatives. Baker, Donders and 
Thompson (2000) suggest that false positive rates should be at or above 90% to reach 
acceptable specificity levels for clinical use. Figure 1 below provides a basic example of how 
such calculations are derived.
Figure 1: The relationship of classification accuracy statistics to rates of accurate 
identification across effort tests
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Test
Result
Diagnosis
▼
Feigning Genuine
Feigning
True positive (TP) False positive (FP) 
[Type I error]
Not
feigning
False negative (FN) 
[Type II error]
True negative (FN)
Positive
Predictive
Power
TP/TP+FP
Negative
Predictive
Power
TN/TN+FP
Sensitivity Specificity
TP/TP+FN TN/FP+TN
Cut-off scores on tests are usually derived from equal samples of malingerers and TBI patients. 
However, this sets the base rate at 50%, which may not reflect the actual rate (Baldessarini, 
Finkelstein, & Arana,, 1983), so Predictive Power is needed to take this into account. Positive 
Predictive Power (PPP) is the probability of the presence of a condition given a positive test 
finding (e.g. the probability of malingering), whilst Negative Predictive Power (NPP) is the 
probability of the absence of a condition given a negative test finding (e.g. the probability of not 
malingering).
As noted above, accuracy is critical for effort tests, as the consequences of inaccurate reporting 
can have serious implications. All neuropsychological tests have imprecise measurement 
capabilities, therefore it is vital to know the accuracy of cut-off scores if appropriate decisions 
are to be made based on such scores. Greve and Bianchini (2004) argue that the key to 
improving diagnostic accuracy is improving PPP, but this requires tests to be evaluated in a 
variety of samples with no incentives to exaggerate or feign. This would give the clinician 
greater confidence that the test is not affected by other factors such as genuine 
neuropsychological difficulties or other clinical conditions such as depression.
Berry and Schipper (2007) suggest that there should be a reasonable convergence of sensitivity 
and specificity rates at the cut-off scores provided for the measure across different reports based 
on comparable samples. They also support the view that scores from a variety of base rate 
samples should be established to support the clinical application of tests. Therefore, tests require 
extensive validation across a wide range of clinical populations, but data of this type is currently 
limited within the literature, and more research is required (Larrabee & Berry, 2007).
1.3.2 Methods for detecting effort
Assessing the impact of effort is multi-faceted, and there has been a substantial increase in the 
variety of procedures used, with results indicating varying classification accuracy. A multitude 
of tests have now been developed to assess the amount of effort an individual is putting forth 
during neuropsychological examination. Such measures have been designed to identify 
fabrication or exaggeration of cognitive deficits and although the tests often appear demanding 
they are designed to be very simple to complete, even for people who have substantial cognitive 
impairments.
Using tests to investigate poor effort involves looking for atypical performance patterns when 
compared to people with a genuine deficit. Such atypical patterns fall into the categories of 
‘unlikely presentations’ and ‘excessive impairment’ (Rogers, 2008b) and can be identified in 
both freestanding measures and standard neuropsychological tests.
1.3.3 Standard neuropsychological tests
Identification of unlikely presentations and excessive impairments on standard 
neuropsychological tests tends to include performance curves, serial position effects, floor 
effects, magnitude of error, atypical performance patterns, and violations of learning principles 
such as recognition versus recall patterns. For example, people believed to be malingering often
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perform much slower than people with a genuine brain injury on tasks involving response times 
(Cercy, Schretlen, & Brandt, 1997).
Such presentations have been identified in a wide range of standard tests (Larrabee, 2007), and 
their use is supported on the basis of efficiency, as neuropsychologists do not have to administer 
extra measures, and the tests serve other functions in addition to identifying problems with 
effort and so may be less recognisable to individuals as assessments of feigning. However, the 
effectiveness of such tests has been called into question (Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree, & Bach, 
1998) and some researchers have concluded that although such performances may indicate 
particular response styles, they should not be used to provide a diagnosis (Bianchini, Mathias, & 
Greve, 2001).
Studies have shown that failure on three or more specific standard neuropsychological tests had 
a very low false-positive rate (Larabee, 2003; Vickery et al., 2004). However, significant 
neurological damage and/or institutionalisation is reported as a modifying factor that must be 
taken into account when evaluating how rare multiple test failure is (Meyers and Volbrecht, 
2003). Rogers (2008b) also suggests that clinicians should combine adaptations of standard tests 
with freestanding measures that have been specifically developed in order to thoroughly 
investigate feigned cognitive impairment. Some examples of standard neuropsychological tests 
that have been used as effort tests are included in Table 1.
1.3.4 Freestanding tests
Typically, freestanding tests used to identify excessive impairment involve two-alternative, 
forced-choice recognition memory tasks that require the examinee to learn and recall previously 
encountered items (e.g. words, digits, pictures) over variable time periods in the presence of a 
distractor. The Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, 2003) utilises a forced-choice word 
recognition paradigm. There are also tests based on other formats and that assess other areas in 
addition to memory, but again these measures are designed so that even people with severe 
impairments can pass the tests. In a meta-analysis by Vickery, Berry, Inman, Harris & Orey 
(2001) forced-choice tests yielded larger effect sizes than more traditional and alternative effort 
measures and as such are considered sensitive and are widely used. Some of the common 
freestanding effort measures can be found in Table 1.
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Table 1: Common effort measures used to identify feigning or exaggerating of symptoms
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Effort Test
Administration
Format
Standard Neuropsychological Tests
Digit Span subtest from the WAIS 
(Iverson & Franzen, 1994)
Mental Control subtest from the WMS (Kelly, Baker, 
van Den Broek, Jackson & Humphries, 2005) 
Warrington Recognition Memory Test 
(Warrington, 1984)
Freestanding Effort Tests: Forced Choice
Digit recall
Recall of over-learned
information
Words/Face recognition
Word Memory Test (Green, 2003)
Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1996) 
Computerised Assessment of Response Bias 
(Conder, Allen & Cox, 1992)
Victoria Symptom Validity Test (Slick et al., 1997) 
Portland Digit Recognition Test (Binder, 1993) 
Coin-In-Hand Test (Kapur, 1994)
Word recognition 
Picture recognition 
Digit recognition
Digit recognition 
Digit recognition 
Location recognition
Freestanding Effort Tests: Non-forced Choice
Rey 15-Item Test (Rey, 1964)
B Test (Boone, et al., 2000)
Dot Counting Test (Rey, 1941) 
Autobiographical Memory Index 
(Wiggins & Brandt, 1988)
Letter/Number/Symbol 
recall and recognition 
Letter recognition and 
discrimination 
Visual processing
Autobiographical recall
In the Slick et al. (1999) diagnostic criteria for definite, probable and possible MND, one of the 
requirements for a ‘definite’ diagnosis is the person performs below chance on forced-choice 
recognition effort tests, but researchers have suggested that before such definitive guidelines can 
be adopted more research is needed. This is specifically due to the problems defining 
‘malingering’, the use of forced-choice measures as the definitive assessment, and the 
assumption that poor effort test performance is only observed in malingerers (Boone, 2007). 
The NAN guidelines (Bush et al., 2005) also suggest that when there is potential for secondary 
gain and the clinician has concerns about effort/reporting, then they must use forced-choice tests 
and procedures to help determine the validity of testing. As a result, if failure on effort tests is 
observed then interpretation of performances on other tests as valid would need to be justified. 
The guidelines also state that tests with the best psychometric properties should be used, and 
that data from tests should be given substantially more weight than subjective indicators 
because of their objectivity. Therefore, forced-choice measures are increasingly being viewed as 
central to understanding participant responses in neuropsychological assessment. As such, an
evaluation of the performance of the effort tests themselves in patients typically seen by 
neuropsychologists is vital for the accurate interpretation of scores in such populations.
There is an underlying assumption that people not trying their best will perform differently than 
those who are putting in their best effort. When presented with forced-choice tests even chance 
performance should be 50%. Therefore someone must actively choose the wrong answer to 
perform at below chance levels, indicating that other factors such as depression or extremely 
impaired functioning are ruled out and intentionally poor performance is the only alternative 
(Trueblood & Binder, 1997). However, studies have shown that although people often score 
poorly, they do not often perform below chance levels (e.g. Binder, 2002). In response to such 
findings researchers have attempted to improve the sensitivity of these tests through the 
development of cut-off scores based on the performance of well-documented patient groups. 
The scores from patients with severe brain injuries and memory disorders who are not in 
litigation have been used to define what the lowest credible performance could be. 
Consequently, developing cut-off scores in this way should ensure that people who are 
genuinely impaired score above the given cut-off, and so only ‘below expected’ performance is 
required as opposed to ‘below chance’ performance when making judgements about effort.
However, cut-off scores are criticised for increasing the probability that a person with genuine 
impairment will be classified as a malingerer (e.g. Haines & Norris, 1995; Suhr & Gunstad, 
2000). It is critical that performance of genuine patients with no incentive to feign is evaluated 
in order to provide a normative standard to compare performance and draw conclusions about 
veracity. The purpose of the following research is to consider the applicability and 
generalisability of effort tests in more detail, and whether the standardised cut-off scores are 
applicable in samples of non-litigating participants.
It is now widely accepted that standardised tests are needed to measure effort (Iverson & 
Binder, 2000) and significant emphasis has been placed on well-validated freestanding forced- 
choice measures (Bush et al., 2005). Research utilising freestanding measures such as the Word 
Memory Test (Green, 2003) has shown that the amount of effort someone puts in can 
significantly affect neuropsychological test scores. For example, studies have identified that 
more people with mild brain injury fail the WMT (Green, Iverson, & Allen, 1999), and score 
lower on other neuropsychological tests than those with genuine brain injury who put in good 
effort (Green, Rohling, Lees-Haley, & Allen, 2001).
Green et al. (1999) examined 298 consecutive patients referred for assessment, 64 of which 
were found to have moderate to severe TBI, with documented Post Traumatic Amnesia of at
16
least 1 day duration. However, 234 were identified as mild head injury. In a differential- 
prevalence design the severe TBI group performed better on the WMT than the mild TBI group.
In a study with 904 litigants, Green et al. (2001) also concluded that 50% of the variance in a 
neuropsychological battery was explained by effort, motivation and cooperation, whereas 
severity of brain injury accounted for less than 5%. In other words, effort accounted for 4.5 
times more variance in symptom complaints and neuropsychological test scores than the 
severity of the head injury. These findings have been identified in other populations, as 
Gorissen, Sanz de la Torre and Schmand (2005) found that 72% of a sample of patients with 
schizophrenia failed the WMT and effort scores accounted for a significant proportion of the 
variance on neuropsychological tests. Such results are of significant importance to the field of 
Neuropsychology, as it implies that previous studies that have investigated brain injury and 
relied upon mean group scores will have been erroneous because of the lack of consideration for 
poor effort.
Studies utilising other effort measures have also identified similar results. For example, 
Constantinou, Bauer, Ashendorf, Fisher and McCaffrey (2005) found the TOMM (Tombaugh, 
1996) explained 47% variance in a summary battery score with mild TBI litigators. However, 
some additional studies have identified superior functioning of the WMT. For example, Gervais, 
Rohling, Green and Ford (2004) compared WMT sensitivity rates with that of the TOMM and 
the CARB in 519 litigants and identified that the WMT had a failure rate of 32% compared to 
17% on the CARB and 11% on the TOMM. The authors of the WMT provide this as evidence 
for the WMT being the most sensitive to feigned cognitive problems. However, Sweet, Condit 
and Nelson (2008) point out that this design most closely resembled a differential prevalence 
design, which is not conclusive in terms of the effectiveness of detection strategies. In addition, 
because the test has good sensitivity, some authors speculate that the specificity (i.e. false­
positive rates) of the test could be reduced (Grote & Hook, 2007).
The authors of the WMT believe that people in litigation are often feigning their deficits. For 
example, recent research published by Flaro, Green and Robertson (2007) claims that failure on 
the WMT was 23 times higher in 774 adults with mild brain injury engaged in litigation (failure 
rate of 40%), compared to 118 parents seeking child custody (failure rate of 1.7%) despite 
similar IQ levels. Therefore, the authors state WMT failure in the brain injury sample is due to 
feigning and not cognitive ability, and on the basis of such results some researchers have 
concluded that the WMT is one of the best measures of this type (e.g. Hartman, 2002).
In a UK study, McCarter, Walton, Brooks and Powell (2009) also surveyed members of the 
British Neuropsychological Society, and of the 130 replies received from practicing
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neuropsychologists 59% reported using tests of effort in their legal work, and 15% used them in 
their clinical assessment. 24% of the respondents used the WMT across all assessments, with 
34% specifying that they used the WMT in medicolegal settings. The McCarter et al. (2009) 
survey emphasises the increasing popularity of stand alone forced-choice instruments such as 
the WMT as measures of effort, particularly in medicolegal settings but increasingly in clinical 
settings. This again emphasises the importance of the accurate performance of such measures 
within a variety of clinical settings and populations.
1.4 Critique of Research
The WMT is one of the most popular and well investigated measures of effort currently 
available, with the authors stating that differences in WMT scores cannot be explained on the 
basis of actual cognitive deficits (Green, 2003; Green et al., 2001). Green (2003) states that “If 
any of the primary effort scores are 82.5% or below, there is a very high probability that other 
test scores from the same person significantly underestimate the person’s actual abilities, owing 
to poor effort” (p. 9). The authors of the WMT have provided several studies that support the 
use of the measure (for review see Green et al. 2002), and claim that it is unique among tests of 
effort because of its “extensive validation in clinical forensic settings, rather than relying on 
simulation research with healthy volunteers” (Green et al., 2002, p. 97, emphasis in the 
original). However, whilst some researchers have supported the author’s claims regarding the 
WMT (Hartman, 2002), it is not clear if the findings from studies such as those conducted by 
Green et al. (1999, 2001) are applicable in all settings and in all populations, and others have 
questioned the conclusions drawn from the studies.
For example, Bowden, Shores & Mathias (2006) found no difference in WMT failure rates 
between mild and severe brain injury in a sample of 100 children and adults in litigation, and 
concluded that the results “may simply indicate that all of the scores from the WMT measure 
memory or some component of general cognitive ability” (p. 868), and they also found high 
false-positive rates in those with severe brain injuries, with failure rates of 40% on WMT-IR 
and 18% on WMT-DR. However, Flaro et al. (2007) argue this is due to small sample size and 
small numbers of participants in the severe category. In addition, they also point out that if the 
WMT did assess memory then the expected findings should indicate that the severe group 
scored lower than the milder group, but no differences were found, therefore they could all 
potentially be putting in the same levels of effort. Despite the conclusions drawn by Flaro et al. 
(2007) the contrary findings of studies such as Bowden et al. (2006) indicate that further 
research is needed to establish the veracity of findings on the WMT.
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A recent study utilising functional neuroimaging with four healthy participants (Allen, Bigler, 
Larsen, Goodrich-Hunsaker & Hopkins, 2007) has shown that areas known to be involved in 
cognitive effort, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, superior parietal lobes and anterior 
cingulate, are activated during WMT performance. The authors conclude that the WMT does 
require significant cognitive effort and is therefore susceptible to damage to any part of the 
neural network that subserves cognitive effort. Although all participants were 100% accurate on 
the delayed recognition trial of the WMT, and the research is limited by the small number of 
participants and lack of control task, such findings do raise questions about how people with 
brain injury may experience difficulties on the WMT due to cognitive effort rather than 
motivation when frontotemporal and limbic regions are damaged. Clinically, Batt, Shores and 
Chekaluk (2008) have also shown that a sample of non-litigating participants with severe brain 
injury struggled to perform well on the WMT when an auditory distraction task was employed 
during learning, with false positive rates on the WMT significantly higher than those on the 
TOMM under such conditions. The authors conclude that the effort components of the WMT 
therefore require more cognitive capacity that was originally thought, despite the claims of 
Green (2003) that the cut-offs are “very low and very conservative”, being “selected to err on 
the side of caution. Using the 82.5% cut-off, there will be very few false positives indeed, even 
in cases of severe traumatic brain injury and neurological disease” (p. 16). In addition, Dean, 
Victor, Boone and Arnold (2008) found a relationship between IQ and nine different measures 
of effort based on standard neuropsychological tests in a sample of 189 outpatients with no 
external incentives. All patients with IQ<70 failed at least one effort test, with increasing failure 
rates as participant IQ decreased, and the specificity rates were unacceptable for most measures 
(i.e., <90%) when IQ dropped below 80. However, no well established freestanding forced- 
choice measures were used in the research.
Other researchers have also criticised the WMT on the basis of limited reliability and failure to 
establish the effectiveness of cut-off scores (Wynkoop & Denny, 2001). Although the 
specificity of effort tests has been studied with non-litigating samples, this has often been in 
relation to other conditions such as Schizophrenia (Gorissen, et al., 2005), or utilising other 
effort measures such as the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (e.g. Macciocchi, Seel, Alderson & 
Godsall, 2006) and malingering indexes on standard neuropsychological tests (e.g. Iverson, 
Slick & Franzen, 2000). Relatively few studies have provided classification accuracy data for 
the WMT, and what evidence exists indicates variability. Without an established gold standard 
effort measure it is difficult to assess validity adequately. However, classification accuracy 
statistics are essential for the thorough evaluation of tests intended for diagnostic use (Meehl & 
Rosen, 1955; Sackett, Straus, Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 2000). As the validity of 
neuropsychological test data is critical for accurate interpretation of results it is important to 
consider how well tests of effort perform and the accuracy of the cut-off scores used to define
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potential feigning. In the McCarter et al. (2009) survey some of the respondents raised concerns 
about the reliability of effort measures. Therefore, these authors also reiterate that independent 
replication of validation studies is needed in order to further verify the test author’s claims 
regarding psychometric properties and evaluate the questions raised regarding the high false 
positive results in clinical groups, particularly those with severe injuries (Merten, et al., 2007; 
Batt, et al., 2008). A paper from the British Psychological Society (BPS) professional practice 
board that is currently out for consultation also emphasises the requirement for “Further 
evidence on UK base rates of cognitive impairment and failure on effort tests in a range of 
clinical presentations and service settings” and that “A better understanding of the sensitivity 
and specificity of tests of effort is needed using UK populations” (p. 15; BPS, unpublished 
consultation document).
Although Green (2003) asserts that “because the cut-off scores are so much lower than the mean 
scores for normal controls, people with brain injuries and young children with major psychiatric 
illness, we would expect the false positive rate to be very low” (p. 40). Green et al. (2002) 
acknowledge that although their research shows examples of many people failing the WMT for 
reasons of insufficient effort, more formal studies are needed to support claims that certain 
people are unable to pass the WMT for other reasons. Very little research has been conducted to 
identify the base rates of failure within clinical populations of participants deemed as genuine. 
One such study is the validation research reported in the WMT manual (Green, 2003) with 57 
moderate-severe brain injured patients (Glasgow Coma Scale score = 9.6). In this study the 
authors found a WMT Immediate Recognition Trial (WMT-IR) pass rate of 95.5% (S.D = 5.1), 
WMT Delayed Recognition (WMT-DR) pass rate of 96.1% (S.D = 3.9), and a WMT 
Consistency Rating (WMT-CR) of 92.8% (S.D = 6.4). 20 patients with neurological diseases 
and impaired memory were also assessed, and their mean WMT-IR pass rate was 96.1% (S.D = 
3.3), WMT-DR = 94.9% (S.D = 5.5), and WMT-CR = 93% (S.D = 5.9), whilst 20 neurological 
patients with normal memory were also found to pass the WMT at similar rates; WMT-IR = 
96.2% (S.D = 3.6), WMT-DR = 96.2% (S.D = 4.9), WMT-CR = 93.8% (S.D = 5.5). However, 
Green (2003) does not make it entirely clear whether the data from the 57 moderate to severe 
cases cited in the manual were actually the same patients reported in the Green and Allen (1999) 
study, or indeed the Green et al. (1999) study. If this is the case then these participants were also 
in litigation, and only assumed to be putting in good effort because their brain scans showed 
actual damage, and their claims for disability benefits had been accepted. A further study by 
Gorissen, Sanz de la Torre, and Schmand (2003) cited in the WMT manual also identified a 
group of neurological patients again performing similarly on the WMT-IR = 95.4% (S.D = 4.9), 
WMT-DR = 96.3% (S.D = 3.6), and WMT-CR = 94.4% (S.D = 4.6), although a later article 
apparently based on the same data does report a 10% failure rate, with 2 of the 20 participants 
failing (Gorissen, et al., 2005).
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In two other studies with non-litigating brain injury participants conducted by researchers not 
directly linked to the WMT, the results are very different. For example, Merten et al. (2006) 
found a base rate failure of 50% (IR and CR) and 58% (DR) was identified with people with 
‘clinically obvious symptoms’ (N = 24). Such findings indicate that people with more severe 
brain injuries fail the WMT at a much higher rate than those with milder brain injuries, 
Significant correlations were also identified between WMT scores and measures of memory and 
learning, a finding which has also been observed by Donders and Boonstra (2007) using the 
WMT and the California Verbal Learning Test (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 2000); WMT- 
IR = .37, WMT-DR -  .33, WMT-CR = .30, p<01.
Merten et al. (2006) conclude that failure on effort tests does not always provide information 
about insufficient effort in people with clinically obvious symptoms and may just in fact reflect 
false positive results. Therefore, it is important to consider the clinical context for interpretation, 
as these participants could potentially be identified as malingering. Such research highlights the 
importance of thoroughly assessing effort tests and accurately identifying failure rates in a 
variety of populations. However, the results of the Merten et al. (2006) study require further 
support because the ‘clinically obvious symptoms’ classification was based on clinical 
judgement, which makes it difficult to replicate. The Merten et al. (2006) study was also 
conducted utilising the German version of the oral WMT and only the WMT-IR and WMT-DR 
subtests were used due to lack of German and Dutch norms. Similar research has yet to be 
conducted with a UK population.
Batt, et al. (2008) support the view that there is very limited independent research currently 
available regarding the sensitivity and specificity of the WMT, only citing from a sample of 64 
litigating participants by Bauer, O'Bryant, Lynch, McCaffrey and Fisher (2007) and 52 student 
participants by Tan. Slick, Strauss and Hultsch (2002). When using the cut-offs provided in the 
manual, the Bauer et al. (2007) study found a sensitivity of .69 and specificity of 1.00, whilst the 
Tan et al. (2002) study found sensitivity and specificity rates of 1.00. High specificity was also 
reported by Brockhaus and Merten (2004) for the German version of the WMT (r = .97), but 
only participants who were judged to be ‘testable’ (less than half of available participants) were 
included (R. Brockhaus, personal communication, May 18, 2006 -  reported in Dean et al., 
2008), which raises questions regarding the representativeness of the sample.
In a study of 60 non-litigating participants with severe brain injuries, Batt, et al. (2008) found 
that 44% of participants in the standard WMT administration group failed the WMT, with 
specificity at 56%. 75% of participants in the distraction group failed the WMT (w here learning 
on the WMT was accompanied by a distraction task). Those that failed were also found to have 
significant!}- lower estimated pre-morbid intelligence than those that passed (Ms =100, 110; SI)
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= 9, II  respectively), F[I,23] = 6.425; p=.019. With a 30% base rate the positive predictive 
value was 50% for the WMT, and if this base rate was lower then the predictive values would 
accordingly fall even lower (Straus. Richardson. Glasziou and Haynes. 2005). Therefore, the 
results of Batt et al. (2008) suggest that the WMT may not be appropriate to use with some 
individuals, particularly where their injuries are severe, and they suggest that further research 
should be conducted to assess whether this extends to other people with legitimate brain 
injuries.
A retrospective study of the WMT-IR trial based on 132 non-litigating participants has also 
been performed by Bunnage, Eichinger, Pearce, Duckworth and Newson (2008). In the study 
Bunnage et al. (2008) attempted to identify failure rates on the WMT-IR, plus any possible 
external incentives that may have contributed to the rates of failure. Anything that could 
reasonably be considered an incentive was included, such as social security disability payments, 
prolonged work absence, and compensation claims. Bunnage et al. (2008) identified a failure 
rate of 25.8%; 9% of the sample had identifiable potential external financial incentives, and 
50% of these participants failed the WMT-IR. 23% of those without any external incentive also 
failed the WMT-IR. Therefore, the authors identified that the conjunction of external incentive 
and failure on the WMT was five times less frequent than failure on the WMT alone. This 
indicates a potentially considerable false positive rate regarding the poor effort interpretation of 
WMT failure in this population, and suggesting that other variables in addition to 
effort/malingering may be contributing to the scores. However, this study did not investigate 
any relationships with other variables in addition to effort, and the retrospective nature of the 
study meant that not all participants were administered all elements of the WMT effort 
measures. Such significant failure rates in a normal clinical sample clearly warrant further 
evaluation and indicate that the conclusion that the WMT is “insensitive to all but the most 
extreme forms of cognitive impairment” (Green, 2003; p. 1) may be erroneous.
Two studies have also been conducted to investigate WMT performance in samples of epilepsy 
patients. Drane et al. (2006) found that 8.1% of epilepsy patients failed the WMT. However, this 
study excluded participants with evidence of recent seizures, those who could not live 
independently, and those with obvious cognitive deficits. Dodrill (2008) used a broader 
definition that encompassed more severe epilepsy participants, and identified a 25% failure rate 
on the WMT. Those who performed poorly on the WMT also did worse on the other 
neuropsychological tests administered, indicating that the WMT does not have a unique role in 
assessing test effort in this study. However, in addition to their differential failure rates, both the 
Drane et al. (2005) and Dodrill (2008) studies used the oral version of the WMT, and did not 
specifically employ other tests of effort. Therefore, these studies require further investigation to 
confirm failure rates on effort measures within an epilepsy sample.
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In summary, effort tests have been used with increasing frequency over the past few years, but 
most of the research has been conducted in populations going through the litigation process (see 
Larrabee, 2003) or with analogue populations asked to simulate deficits (e.g. Iverson & 
Franzen, 1996). This has helped to establish the sensitivity of effort measures, but less attention 
has been paid to the specificity. The clinical application of effort tests is dependent on research 
conducted to establish cut-off scores, but the samples used in developing these interpretative 
guidelines are often heterogeneous and relatively small (Macciocchi et al., 2006). Most effort 
tests have not been extensively validated with non-litigating populations, severely brain injured 
populations, or with alternative populations such as epilepsy. Establishing the base rates of 
failure in populations with genuine cognitive problems and no incentive to feign can provide 
evidence for the robustness of such measures, as specificity may be lower than anticipated in 
these populations, which would increase the risk of false-positives.
1.5 Current Thesis and Justification of Methodology
As stated, currently there is an interest within the literature on forced-choice measures, 
particularly those that have been developed as freestanding tools. Therefore, the main focus of 
this research will be on the WMT. However, several other measures that have been used to 
assess feigning will also be included. This will provide a more rounded picture of the 
performance of the WMT and a clearer indication of scores that can be expected on effort tests 
in the clinical population being assessed, along with adding to the literature regarding the 
properties of the additional measures chosen. A straightforward method that specifically 
investigates rates of failure on effort tests in three clinical populations with no incentive to feign 
has been chosen. This method is novel for a number of reasons:
■ Cognitive functioning is frequently affected following brain injury, but it is difficult to 
assess if the person genuinely has deficits, especially if there is potential for secondary gain. 
The use of effort testing has substantially increased, and forced-choice measures are 
becoming accepted as the ‘gold standard’ way of assessing suboptimal effort. However, 
recent debate has arisen regarding sensitivity and specificity (e.g. Bianchini et al., 2001). 
Several authors have reported that that prevalence estimates for effort test failure in clinical 
evaluations are extremely limited, despite the importance of such rates for the accurate 
interpretation of tests (Larrabee, Greiffenstein, Greve & Bianchini, 2007; Rogers 2008b). 
Therefore, they recommend further studies that include a wide range of non-litigating 
participants to investigate specificity, in order to develop a reasonable convergence of 
sensitivity and specificity rates at the provided cut-off scores across comparable samples.
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■ It remains necessary to determine whether measures of effort, particularly the WMT, 
accurately classify particular clinical groups, as clinicians have a duty of care not to label 
people as having a brain injury or psychiatric disorder if they are malingering, or diagnosing 
someone as malingering when they have a genuine brain injury or are legitimately unwell. 
Such misdiagnosis can have serious implications, including delayed treatment, the provision 
of inappropriate treatment, or lack of treatment altogether. Therefore, base rate information 
can help with diagnostic accuracy, as the more accurate the base rate estimates the more 
unlikely an error in classification.
■ All standardised measures need independent evaluation of their psychometric properties. 
However, many measures of effort are lacking in this area. With regard to the WMT, most 
of the research has been conducted by the authors and their colleagues (e.g. Green, 2003; 
Green et al., 1999; Green et al., 2001). Therefore, the current study aims to provide 
information about the performance of effort measures in order to add to their psychometric 
validation.
■ There is a lack of published information relating to the reasons why people may fail effort 
tests and the frequency of failing for genuine reasons is not known, particularly as most of 
the research conducted with the WMT has been with people in litigation. Such effort 
measures need research to independently assess performance in clinical samples of 
participants not in litigation in order to establish whether any people may fail effort tests for 
genuine reasons. No studies have looked specifically at whether there are differential failure 
rates in UK samples of inpatient, community-based, and epilepsy-related brain injury 
populations who have no incentive to feign when using effort measures such as the WMT. 
The current research is designed to investigate effort test performance in these distinct 
groups and compare their performance relative to the standard cut-offs. Although rates of 
sensitivity (i.e. correct classification as not malingering) can only be assumed, this research 
uses the strategy of assessing people with genuine brain injuries with no external incentives 
as a strategy for evaluating specificity rates. This cross-sectional design allows comparisons 
across several distinct groups, although it cannot establish whether rates may vary over 
time.
■ In addition to identifying base rates within groups, the method allows for groups to be 
combined and analysed as a non-litigation group. This provides a way of investigating 
particular variables in addition to effort that may be contributing to effort test scores. In- 
depth analyses on individual data for people who fail the tests can also be conducted to 
develop a better understanding of why people with genuine impairments and no incentive to 
feign may perform poorly.
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■ Studies involving genuine malingerers are extremely difficult to undertake due to inherent 
problems involved in the identification of such people. Therefore, alternative ways of 
investigating performance on measures purported to assess effort are required. The current 
research provides a method of investigating the validity of effort tests in populations that are 
more easily accessible to clinicians.
■ The current methodology is important for establishing meaningful effort test interpretations, 
and maximising confidence in the results of neuropsychological testing, diagnoses, and 
recommendations made on the basis of such results. Data from people with genuine brain 
injuries can therefore provide information about the appropriateness of current interpretive 
guidelines.
1.6 Research Questions
Based on the above review, the current research will investigate three central research questions. 
The main question concerns the identification of the base rate incidence of failure on effort tests 
in a genuine brain injury population with no external incentive to feign, as there is a lack of 
research into the performance of clinical populations on measures of effort. Two subsidiary 
research questions will also be investigated. Specifically, whether any factors in addition to 
effort contribute to effort test scores and whether different genuine brain injury populations 
(inpatients, community or epilepsy) fail effort tests at different rates, as it may be that some 
effort tests are influenced by factors other than effort at certain stages of injury, and the base 
rates across varying samples of participants with legitimate brain injuries have not been 
thoroughly researched.
METHOD
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Overview
This section includes the methods employed in the current study to investigate the research 
questions outlined above. Specifically, this part of the thesis describes ethics, participants, 
inclusion and exclusion criteria, recruitment, study design, measures used, and administration 
procedures.
2.1 Ethics
The research was given approval by Leeds Central Ethics Committee. Managerial approval was 
also granted by the Research and Development Directorate of Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS 
Trust Further ethical approval was also obtained from Charity A (to protect anonymity). The 
Charity offers community supported housing and home support services to people at the final 
stage of rehabilitation following acquired brain injury. All required ethical approvals were 
obtained by July 2008, prior to the commencement of data collection.
2.2 Participants
2.2.1 Inclusion/exclusion criteria
All participants were required to be over 18 and have a diagnosed brain injury or epilepsy 
(identified through brain scans and/or brain EEG). Participants were also required to have a 
good grasp of the English language, and provide written informed consent.
Participants were excluded if they were in ongoing litigation or using any substances that might 
influence cognitive test scores (e.g. psychotropic medication or current substance misuse). The 
presence of comorbidity judged by the clinical team to be a significant influence (e.g. serious 
somatic or psychiatric disease), or visual or motor dysfunction that precluded administration of 
computerised tasks (e.g. Hemiparesis), were also used as the basis for exclusion from the study. 
In addition, potential participants were excluded if the clinical team considered that they did not 
have the capacity to consent, or the team judged them as not capable of participating in the 
study.
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2.2.2 Recruitment
The recruitment of participants took place between July 2008 and May 2009. The total data 
collection period was 10 months.
All potential participants were identified by clinical staff involved in their care, at the 
neuropsychological service they were engaged with. Recruitment for all participants took place 
through a number of methods:
a) Information regarding the research was provided to all three recruiting centres. 
Therefore, some participants were referred directly by consultants and clinical team 
members.
b) Regular visits to a hospital ward were made to recruit suitable inpatients with a brain 
injury.
c) Attendance at rehabilitation team meetings established the suitability of potential 
participants with a brain injury currently living in the community.
d) Neurology clinics were attended regularly to recruit participants with epilepsy.
During ward and clinic visits, initial contact with potential participants was made by a member 
of the clinical team, who would obtain agreement for the investigator to approach them.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria were consulted, and if the potential participant was suitable they 
were provided with a Participant Information Sheet (see appendix 5.1). Those who were 
interested in participating were then contacted by the investigator, and in some cases the 
investigator was on hand to speak directly to those interested. A diagram to show the initial 
contact procedure is shown in appendix 5.3.
If the potential participant was willing to take part they were then contacted by the investigator, 
who answered any questions the participant had. Testing was then arranged at a time and place 
suitable to the participant. The investigator did not have contact details for potential 
participants. However, the participant could choose to be assessed either at the hospital or at 
their home. If the participant chose to be seen at home, then they, or their carers, supplied the 
contact details directly. No external incentive was provided to any of the participants, although 
reimbursement of travel expenses was offered.
Although the brain injury groups represent participants who all have a cognitive impairment, 
this was at a level where they were still able to provide valid consent for themselves. However, 
due to the nature of the participant’s difficulties, the recruitment and consent process was
carefully considered. Some participants needed to have the information presented to them in a 
user friendly way and allowed time for repeated exposure and opportunity to ask questions, so 
that they could gain a thorough and comprehensive understanding of what participating in the 
research would mean for them before they made their decision.
Consent took the form of both verbal and written consent that was checked throughout the 
process (see appendix 5.2 for Consent Form). Participants were provided with written 
information about the study that they could keep, and given the opportunity to meet directly 
with the researcher to discuss any issues they had. It was also made explicit that the study was 
for research purposes and not an intervention, and that whatever they decided about 
participating would not affect any services they received.
Due to the variety of methods used for recruitment, it is not possible to accurately identify 
everyone who was considered for participation in the study but excluded by the clinical team 
based on inclusion/exclusion criteria before being approached. However, a total of 56 people 
were directly approached to participate; eight declined to participate, and three were withdrawn 
before testing was completed. Figure 2 shows the number of people who were approached and 
participated.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of the number of people participating in the study
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All of the 20 community participants were assessed in their own homes, and all of the 11 
inpatient participants were assessed on the rehabilitation ward they were currently staying on. 
Eleven of the participants with epilepsy were also assessed in their own home, whilst the other 
five participants with epilepsy were assessed at the hospital they attended for outpatient 
appointments.
2.2.3 Demographic Information
Demographic data were obtained from medical notes provided by the treating consultant, and 
from the participant. Table 2 provides a list of the specific demographic information collected 
for all participant groups.
Table 2: Demographic information collected from all three brain-injury populations
Inpatient and Community 
Participants
Epilepsy
Participants
Date of birth Date of birth
Gender Gender
Education level Education level
Handedness Handedness
Benefits Benefits
Date of brain injury Age at seizure onset
Nature of brain injury Seizure type
Lesion Location Lesion Location
Data were collected from 47 people in total and a variety of statistical procedures were used to 
analyse the data. As will be shown in the results section, any strategy for analysis produced 
similar findings.
All participants were aged between 19 and 73 years old, with a mean age of 44.6. The 
participants from the Epilepsy (M = 36.1; SD: 10.2) sample were also observed to be younger 
than the Community (M = 46.01, SD: 12.1) or Inpatient (M = 54.1; SD: 13.5) samples. This 
difference was significant (F[2, 44]=7.746, p=.001), with the Epilepsy participants being 
significantly younger than the Community (Hochberg’s GT2, p=.048) or Inpatient groups 
(Hochberg’s GT2, p=,001).
The average number of years in education was 13.0; ranging from no qualifications to Masters 
Degree level. 32 men (68%) and 15 women (32%) participated in the study, 37 of which were 
right handed (79%) and 10 left handed (21%).
All participants in the Community and Epilepsy groups were found to be in receipt of at least 
some form of benefit as a result of their condition; including free prescriptions, incapacity 
benefits, or disability living allowance. Data were not available regarding the benefit status of 
the Inpatient group. Despite this, it is unlikely that these participants were receiving any benefits 
as a result of their current injury due to how recent their injury was.
Data were available from medical notes regarding the nature of brain injury, location of injury, 
and time since injury/diagnosis. As expected, the Community and Inpatient groups had more 
varied brain injuries than the Epilepsy group. Table 3 contains a breakdown of the nature of 
injuries across the three groups of participants.
Table 3: Nature and location of brain injury within the Community and Inpatient groups
30
Nature of Brain Injury Community Epilepsy Inpatient Total
Hypoxic 3 (15%) - - 3 (6.4%)
Traumatic Brain Injury 11(55%) - 3 (27.3%) 14 (29.8%)
Cerebrovascular accident 4 (20%) - 6 (54.5%) 10(21.3%)
Infection 2(10%) - - 2 (4.3%)
Tumour - 4 (25%) 2(18.2%) 6 (12.8%)
Seizures - 12 (75%) - 12(25.5%)
Location of injury varied depending on the group membership. People in the Epilepsy sample 
had focal lesions (mainly in the left or right temporal brain regions), whereas participants from 
the Community and Inpatient groups had more diffuse and anterior damage. In addition, 
differences were identified between the time since injury/diagnosis of the participant subgroups, 
with the Community participants having a mean time since injury of 11.9 years (range 1 - 3 0  
years), the Epilepsy sample having a mean time since diagnosis of 22.9 years (range 2 - 4 3  
years) and the Inpatient sample having a mean time since injury of 1.1 months (range 0 - 2  
months). This difference was found to be significant (F[2, 22.4]=37.812, p<.001), with the 
Inpatient group having more recent injuries compared to the Community group (Hochberg’s 
GT2, p=.035) and the Epilepsy group (Hochberg’s GT2, p<,001).
The information from the Epilepsy sample also indicates that a number of the participants had 
received an epilepsy diagnosis in early childhood, which had continued throughout their adult 
lives.
It was anticipated that there would be some overlap in epilepsy diagnosis between participant 
groups, as epilepsy can be a consequence of a brain injury. Therefore, those with a secondary 
diagnosis of epilepsy as a result of a brain injury were included in the Community/Inpatient
groups, and those with epilepsy as their primary presenting problem, or due to an in situ tumour 
resulting in monitoring at an epilepsy clinic, were included in the Epilepsy sample.
The information collated regarding location of brain injury was divided into three groups (Left, 
Right and Other). However, information regarding location varied from individual to individual, 
with some participants having much more detailed notes available than others. Therefore, when 
information within notes indicated several areas of damage, the participant was either allocated 
to the ‘Left’ or ‘Right’ group depending on where the majority of damage was reported to be, or 
to the ‘Other’ group if no main site of damage was specified or the main site was reported as 
another area (e.g. ‘frontal’).
It was also hoped that Post Traumatic Amnesia (PTA) scores and Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) 
scores would be identified for all participants within the Community and Inpatient samples. 
However, PTA and GCS data could not be located for the Community group, PTA scores were 
not available for the Inpatient group, and GCS scores were only available for a limited number 
of participants from the Inpatient group (mainly those people who had experienced a traumatic 
brain injury).
Information regarding time since injury/diagnosis was also recorded in the current study. 
However, it is acknowledged that this variable is problematic due to the inherent differences 
between the participant groups. It is not possible to identify a ‘time since injury’ for the 
Epilepsy sample, only ‘time since diagnosis’, and the nature of Epilepsy and improvements in 
treatments means that the severity of their symptoms is likely to have varied over time.
2.2.4 Psychological/Neuropsychologica! data
Data was available regarding Pre-morbid IQ, Speed of Information Processing, Anxiety, 
Depression and Memory. The mean, standard deviation, median, inter-quartile range (IQR), and 
absolute range of these variables can be found in Table 4.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for psychological and neuropsychological data
Variable Mean S.D. Median IQR AbsoluteRange
Pre-morbid IQ 96.8 10.7 98.0 86.0 -104.8 81.0-115.0
Processing Speed 50.8 18.4 47.0 36.0-64.0 19.0-100.0
Anxiety 6.4 4.2 6.0 3.0-9.0 0.0-20.0
Depression 4.9 4.0 4.0 2.0 - 7.0 0.0-20.0
WMT-MC 66.3 17.4 65.0 53.8 - 76.3 35.0 -100.0
WMT-PA 54 21.9 52.5 38.8-71.3 15.0-90.0
WMT-FR 33.5 18.4 32.5 16.9-45.6 5.0 - 72.5
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As Table 4 shows, from the scores that could be accurately calculated no participants were 
identified as within the learning disabilities range (IQ < 70) prior to injury. A large range of 
scores were identified on all the other variables. Processing speed ranged from below the 2nd 
percentile to the 82“d percentile (compared to standardised norms from the normal population).
Memory scores were also widely distributed, with descriptive statistics reflecting the increasing 
difficulty of the three memory tests from the WMT. This was also noted to differ across 
participant groups (see Table 5). However, no scores are reported for the Inpatient group, as 
these measures were not administered to this population.
Table 5: Differences between the Community and Epilepsy subgroups based on the WMT 
memory measures
Variable Community Mean (SD)
Epilepsy 
Mean (SD)
WMT-MC 61.4(18.8) 71.9(14.2)
WMT-PA 46.1 (21.8) 63.1 (18,7)
WMT-FR 25.1 (15.3) 42.8 (17.5)
Significant differences were identified between the Epilepsy and Community subgroups on the 
WMT-PA (F[l,32]=5.890, p=.021) and WMT-FR (F[l,32]=9.869, p=.004), and scores 
approached significance for WMT-MC (F[l,32]=3.299, p=.079), revealing that the Community 
participants had significantly poorer memory scores than the Epilepsy participants.
Age was related to memory scores on the WMT-PA (F[l, 32]=4.500, p=.042) and WMT-FA 
(F[l, 32]=7.080, p=.012) in the expected direction, with those in the higher age group having 
lower memory scores. Time since injury/diagnosis was also linked to WMT-MC 
(F[l,32]=6.720, p=.014), with lower scores in the less time since injury/diagnosis group. All 
WMT memory measures were also related to each other at the p<.05 level.
Although the overall mean and median scores for Anxiety and Depression are below cut-off 
levels for caseness, some participants did score above this level (see Table 6). 23.4% of the total 
sample scored at cut-off or above for significant levels of anxiety, and 36.2% of the overall 
sample scored at cut-off or above on measures of depression. A statistically significant 
difference was found between people reaching the clinical cut-off for anxiety across the three 
subgroups (Likelihood ratio: p=.030), with more people in the Epilepsy subgroup falling above 
the clinical cut-off. Although Depression levels are noted to be higher in the Epilepsy subgroup, 
this difference was not found to be significant (Likelihood ratio: p=.558). When analysed using 
ANOVA the expected relationship between Anxiety (F[l,45/46]=18.696, p<.001) and
Depression was also found, with scaled Anxiety scores being higher in the depressed group, and 
vice versa (F[l, 45]=13.336, p=.001).
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Table 6: Anxiety and Depression Scores across all participant groups
Brain Injury 
Group Anxiety Depression
Community
Inpatient
Anxious
4 - 20.0% 
3-27.3%
Not
Anxious 
16 - 80.0% 
8 - 72.7%
Depressed
3-15.0%  
3 - 27.3%
Not
Depressed 
17 - 85.0% 
8 - 72.7%
Epilepsy 10 - 62.5% 6 - 37.5% 5-31.2% 11-68.8%
Total 11 - 23.4% 36-76.6% 17-36.2% 30 - 63.8%
2.3 Design
This study used an exploratory design to investigate measures of effort in relation to other 
variables and within a range of participants. Participants across three distinct groups of non­
litigating brain injury populations were each administered a number of neuropsychological, 
psychological, and demographic measures in addition to measures of effort. The dependent 
variable throughout was measures of effort, and group comparisons were made based on effort 
test pass and failure rates.
2.3.1 Power calculation
As mentioned in the literature review, the only studies providing information regarding the 
performance of genuine brain injured participants with no incentives to feign on the WMT are 
those conducted by Green (2003) and Merten et al. (2006), whilst only Drane et al. (2006) and 
Dodrill (2008) have studied epilepsy patients and reported conflicting findings.
As a result of the limited amount of research conducted using the WMT in genuine samples of 
brain injured and epilepsy participants, it is not appropriate to calculate statistical power. 
However, it is believed that 47 participants is enough to find an observed statistical difference 
because the WMT authors state that it is meant to be “virtually insensitive to all but the most 
extreme forms of impairment of learning and memory” (Green et al. 2002, p. 99), with a very 
narrow range of genuine scores. It is anticipated that at least some of the participants in the 
current study will fail even though they do not have ‘the most extreme forms of learning and 
memory impairments’. In addition, the participant sample from Merten et al. (2006) was 48, 
Therefore, 47 participants were felt to represent an adequate number of participants in the 
absence of a calculable power analysis,
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2.4 Measures
There were a number of individual tests within the main battery, but most were designed to be 
short, which helped to ensure participants engaged, and frustration with any particular test was 
minimised because they moved on quickly. The tests have also been designed specifically for, 
or validated for use with, people who have a brain injury, ensuring that the tests were 
appropriate for the participant group.
2.4.1 Effort test measures
A number of independent measures of effort were employed in the research. These measures 
were selected based on evidence of effectiveness, availability, and ease of administration. Table 
7 provides a breakdown of the effort test cut-off scores and the validation research used to 
identify these cut-off levels.
Table 7: Summary of Effort measures and cut off scores used in the current study
Effort Measure C ut-off Score
WMT Immediate Recognition < 82.5% (Green, 2003)
WMT Delayed Recognition < 82.5% (Green, 2003)
WMT Consistency Rating < 82.5% (Green, 2003)
Coin-In-Hand Test <8.5 (Kelly et al. 2005)
Autobiographical Memory Index <10.5 (Kelly et al. 2005)
Mental Control Subtest <13.5 (Kelly et al. 2005)
Digit Symbol-Coding Subtest <5 (Inman & Berry, 2002)
Short Recognition Memory Test for Faces < 17 (Kemp et al. 2008)
The Word Memory Test. (Green, 2003)
The WMT has been chosen as the main outcome measure because of its widespread use and its 
limited evaluation by researchers who are not directly involved with the WMT. As can be seen 
in the literature review, the authors claim a unique role for the WMT, and several validation 
studies support its use.
The WMT involves a computerised administration procedure, in which a list of 20 word pairs is 
presented (e.g. rat-tail). After the word pairs have been viewed there is an Immediate 
Recognition (WMT-IR) trial, where the participant must choose the word from the original list 
from 40 new word pairs (e.g. rat, from rat-shoe). After a delay of 30 minutes there is then a 
Delayed Recognition (WMT-DR) trial, which is similar to the WMT-IR, but includes different 
foil words (e.g. rat-sock). A consistency rating (WMT-CR) is then calculated on the basis of
these two results. When the participant chooses the correct word it is highlighted in green and a 
sharp tone is heard, when the incorrect word is chosen it is highlighted in red and a flat tone is 
heard.
Participants are then administered other measures designed to assess memory ability; a Multiple 
Choice Task (WMT-MC; where participants are shown the first word from each pair and asked 
to choose from eight options), a Paired Associates Task (WMT-PA; where the examiner 
provides the first word and the participant must provide the second word), and a Free Recall 
Task (WMT-FR; where participants are asked to say as many of the words as possible that they 
remember). A Long-Delayed Free Recall task can also be administered 20 minutes after the end 
on the WMT-FR administration, though this was not utilised in the current research due to time 
constraints.
The computerised output for the WMT states whether the participant has passed or failed the 
WMT-IR, WMT-DR and WMT-CR effort measures based on the established cut-off score of 
82.5%, which Green (2003) states is “very conservative indeed” and “there are very few “false 
positives” with the exception of people with dementia” (p. 9, quote in original), as scores at this 
cut-off represent 5.5 standard deviations (S.D) below the normal adult control group mean for 
WMT-IR, and 6.7 S.D below then normal mean for WMT-DR. It also represents scores at the 
second percentile for patients with moderate to severe brain injuries as assessed by Green and 
Allen (1999). One or more scores below cut-off on any of these three WMT effort measures is 
taken as a failure on the test.
The WMT output also provides a ‘caution’ if the participant scores between 82.5% and 90.0% 
on these effort measures, as Green et al. (2001) found that these scores were not very different 
from those cases who failed, and still represent two S.D below the normal adult mean and one 
S.D below the mean for people with severe brain injuries. Therefore, such scores are “doubtful 
in most cases” (Green, 2003; p. 16).
In addition, ‘warnings’ are also provided if scores are 70% or below for the WMT-MC, and 
50% or below for the WMT-PA, and Green (2003) states that “This is to draw attention to the 
fact that, i f  the person has dementia and is in need o f supervision, or has a similar very profound 
impairment, these results might be valid. However, such scores “are of questionable validity in 
most cases” (Green, 2003; p. 7).
Although Green (2003) recommends the WMT-CR as a measure of effort, it was decided that 
this measure would not be used in the current research due to the reliance of this calculation on 
the scores obtained for the WMT-IR and WMT-DR.
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The Coin-In-Hand Test. (C-I-H: Kapur, 1994)
The C-I-H test involves asking participants to remember in which hand a British ten pence coin 
is placed. The experimenter shows the participant a coin in one hand for two seconds, and then 
closes both hands. Participants are then asked to count backwards from ten to one out loud with 
their eyes closed, then open their eyes and point to which hand the coin is in. The experimenter 
then opens their hands to reveal the coin. The C-I-H test is repeated for ten trials. In the current 
research the participants were informed that it was not a magic trick, and the coin would always 
be in the hand in which they had seen it. The order of administration for all participants was as 
follows: right, left, left, right, right, left, right, left, right, left.
This measure is proposed to be a very quick test of effort. Kapur (1994) reported that two 
suspected malingerers performed at chance levels on the C-I-H test, whereas five patients with 
neurological conditions were correct on all trials. Cochrane, Baker and Meudell (1998) found 
that the C-I-H identified 95% of simulating malingerers, and Kelly, Baker, van den Broek, 
Jackson and Humphries (2005) also report good sensitivity and specificity data when comparing 
simulators versus 40 patients with an acquired brain injury (sensitivity = 92.5; specificity = 
87.5), and identified a cut off score of <8.5 in the detection of feigning.
Autobiographical Memory Index. (AMI; Wiggins & Brandt, 1988)
The AMI used in the current research is a slightly modified version (Kelly et al. 2005), which 
includes 11 questions concerning general information about the participant. The modified 
version omits the question ‘what is your social security number’, because it is not relevant to a 
UK population. Answers on the AMI are scored as either plausible or incorrect, with incorrect 
answers being clearly wrong or the participant having no knowledge of the answer.
The AMI was designed specifically to investigate malingering (Wiggins and Brandt, 1988), and 
Cochrane et al. (1998) found it was able to differentiate between simulators and non-simulating 
participants. Kelly et al. (2005) identified a cut-off of <10.5 (sensitivity 77.5; specificity 72.5) to 
identify feigning.
Mental Control Subtest. (MC: Wechsler Memory Scale-Ill; Wechsler, 1997b)
MC is an optional test from the WMS-III, and includes eight tasks involving the retrieval and 
manipulation of over-learned information. For example, participants are asked to count 
backwards from 20 to 1, and say the letters of the alphabet. A total score for all eight tests is 
computed.
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Although not widely used as a test of effort, its utility has been investigated by Kelly et al. 
(2005), who propose that feigning could be identified using MC when participants take a long 
time to complete each subtask, feign response accuracy, or use a combination of both strategies. 
These researchers showed that MC has good sensitivity (80.5) and specificity (82.5) for 
detecting simulating participants, and when used in combination with C-I-H it is an effective 
screening tool for obvious malingering. Cut off for failure is taken from Kelly et al. (2005) as 
<13.5.
Disit Symbol-Coding Subtest. (DS-C; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Ill; Wechsler, 1997a)
DS-C is a subtest of the WAIS-III, in which participants must copy symbols paired with 
numbers. In the standardisation sample for the WAIS-III it was found that most normal 
individuals perform well on this task (Wechsler, 1997a), so any low scores provide an indication 
of neuropsychological deficits in these areas. However, a DS-C scaled score of <5 has been 
proposed to identify malingerers (Trueblood, 1994). This cut-off was also used by Inman and 
Berry (2002), resulting in specificity levels of 100% and sensitivity levels of 2%.
The Short Recognition Memory Test for Faces, (from the Camden Memory Test, CMTF; 
Warrington, 1996)
The CMTF measures a distinct aspect of recognition memory and is suitable for use with people 
with language and verbal memory difficulties. The CMTF involves the presentation of 30 
pictures of faces at 3 second intervals. After the presentation of 25 faces, the participant is then 
asked to identify which face they have seen from a choice of two.
The Camden Memory Test has been proposed as a measure of effort due to its forced-choice 
recognition format and ceiling effects with people who have mild TBI (Warrington, 1996). The 
probability of a score occurring by chance can be calculated using Binomial Probability 
analysis. Cut-off for failure on the CMTF task was taken as <5th age-related centile (i.e. scores 
below which only 5% of sample scored). This is in line with the research of Kemp, Coughlan, 
Rowbottom, Wilkinson, Teggart and Baker (2008) who used the Short Pictorial Recognition 
Memory Test from the Camden battery as a measure of effort. The 71-89 age group was 
selected to be conservative, with 5% of this sample scoring 17/25 or below.
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2.4.2 Supplementary measures
Wechsler Test o f Adult Reading. (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001)
During administration of the WTAR, participants are asked to correctly pronounce 50 
phonetically regular and irregular words. The WTAR is included to assess pre-morbid 
intellectual comparability across three groups of participants. The WTAR has also been co- 
normed with the WAIS-III and WMS-III, and therefore is the most appropriate measure of prior 
intelligence levels to use because it shares a common standardisation sample with some of the 
other measures in the study.
Speed o f Information Processing Subtest. (SoIP; from the BIRT Memory and Information 
Processing Battery; Coughlan, Oddy, & Crawford, 2007)
During the SoIP task, participants are presented with a sheet of paper containing rows of five 
numbers between 10 and 99, and then asked to mark the second highest number in each row for 
a total duration of four minutes. After this, a test of hand speed is also administered, in which 
the participant must cross out numbers as quickly as possible. This test is administered in order 
to factor in any motor difficulties that may impact on the speed of processing findings.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983)
The HADS is a self-report questionnaire measure of emotional wellbeing consisting of 14 items 
(seven-item depression subscale and seven-item anxiety subscale) used to screen for depression 
and anxiety over the past week. Questions are answered on a 0-3 scale. The measure was 
specifically designed for use with people who have medical conditions; as a result it reduces the 
likelihood of false-positives by excluding items related to somatic symptoms. Research has also 
indicated that the HADS performs similarly to the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer 
& Brown, 1996) and the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & 
Neckelmann, 2002). Scores of eight or above for both anxiety and depression has been deemed 
the most appropriate cut-off for classifying people as anxious or depressed (Bjelland et al., 
2002).
Brief Effort Questionnaire.
Finally, to assess the participant’s own perception of their effort, a number of reflective 
questions about their experience of the test session were asked. The first question was:
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■ A sa percentage, how much effort do you think you put into these tasks? 
Depending on the answer given to the first question, additional scaling questions were asked 
based on a motivational interviewing format. If they indicated that they put in 100% effort, then 
they were asked the following questions:
■ Did anything ever stop you from putting in 100%
■ Would anything have helped you do any better?
If the participants indicated that they did not put in 100% then they were asked the following 
questions:
■ What stopped you from being able to put in 100%?
■ What would need to happen for you to put in 100%?
Prompts were provided as necessary to allow the participants time to grasp what the questions 
meant. However, despite thorough explanation of the question in relation to concepts such as 
‘trying your best* and ‘doing as well as you could’, and diagrams of a Visual Analogue Scale, 
some of the participants found these questions difficult to understand and provided answers in 
relation to their brain injury/poor memory as an obstacle to performing well rather than whether 
they tried their best. Therefore, calculations based on these answers were not conducted as part 
of the results section.
2.4.3 Time taken to complete tests
A breakdown of the approximate testing time can be seen in Table 8.
Table 8: Approximate testing time for community and epilepsy participants
Measure Time Taken to Complete 
(in minutes)
WTAR 2-5
HADS 5-10
WMT 15-20
C-I-H 2-4
AMI 1-2
SoIP 5
DS-C 3
MC 4-5
CMTF 5-6
Total 42-60
The acute brain injury participants were expected to experience significantly more difficulties 
with fatigue and attention, therefore a shorter battery was employed. Table 9 contains a 
breakdown of the approximate testing time for the Inpatient participants.
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Table 9: Approximate testing time for inpatient participants
Measure Time Taken to Complete 
(in minutes)
WTAR 2-5
HADS 5-10
WMT (IR & DR) 10-15
Total 17-30
(with a break between WMT
administrations)
2.5 Procedure
At assessment the investigator went through the Information Sheet again with the participant, 
ensuring that they were aware of confidentiality, that their participation was voluntary, and that 
they were free to withdraw at any time. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants prior to their inclusion in the study, and this was administered by the investigator to 
ensure that the participant fully comprehended the implications of participation. All participants 
were assigned an identification number to protect anonymity.
Standardised administration instructions were followed and all testing was conducted 
individually. Participants were again instructed to put in their best effort, although they were not 
provided with explicit information regarding the effort testing component of the study. Each 
participant was then administered the battery of tests as outlined in Figures 4 and 5.
Prior to any memory tests being administered, two other tasks not involving memory were 
introduced to alleviate anxiety. The WMT is structured so that a half hour gap in testing is 
required between Immediate and Delayed conditions, where no verbal tests of memory can be 
administered. Therefore, the non-verbal tests and other tests that are not related to memory were 
presented at this point.
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Figure 3: Community and Epilepsy participant test administration
WTAR
HADS
WMT-IR C-I-H WMT-DR CMTF
MC WMT-MC Questions
SoIP ♦ WMT-PA ♦
AMI WMT-FR
DS-C
Figure 4: Inpatient participant test administration
Although a variety of procedures were employed to ensure that participants were able to 
complete the test battery in good time and with minimal distress, the researcher was also 
mindful of the difficulties in recruiting and engaging the particular participant groups involved 
in the study. Therefore, more time was often spent with the participant in order to build up 
rapport and help the participant feel at ease.
It was anticipated prior to testing that some participants would become distressed during the 
research for a variety of reasons, such as fatigue or frustration. Therefore, a standardised 
protocol for halting assessment was designed prior to the commencement of the research and 
this protocol was followed based on the clinical judgement of the researcher. The protocol was 
followed on three occasions, with two participants requiring the test administration to be 
stopped by the researcher, and one participant choosing for the assessment to be stopped for 
reasons unrelated to distress (see appendix 5.4 for protocol).
At the end of testing, all of the participants were offered the opportunity to debrief and ask any 
questions they had relating to the research. Where requested or required, the participants were 
also provided with support independent of the interviewer. Such support included informing an 
appropriate member of staff (with the participant’s consent), or providing written information 
regarding local brain injuiy services.
RESULTS
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3.1 Overview
The main aim of the current research is the investigation of the base rates of failure* on a number 
of effort tests in three genuine populations with no external incentives to feign (inpatient, 
community, and epilepsy-related brain injury). This is in order to provide further evaluation of 
the measures and answer questions in relation to the base rate incidence of failure on effort tests 
in a non-litigating brain injury population, whether different non-litigating brain injury 
populations (inpatients, community or epilepsy) fail effort tests at different rates, and whether 
any other factors in addition to effort contribute to effort test scores. Therefore, the main 
outcome measure is the proportion of people who failed effort tests. Other explanatory variables 
were also administered and analysed to investigate potential reasons why people may fail the 
WMT.
This results section is subdivided into six main areas in order to answer the research questions 
described above; data preparation, description of statistical analyses, overall failure rates, group 
differences, relationships between tests, and individual cases.
First, a description of the data is provided, with consideration given to missing data and outliers. 
Second, a description of the statistical procedures used to analyse the data is presented. Third, 
data demonstrating overall failure rates is presented, in which all non-litigating brain-injury 
participants were combined into a single group to increase the statistical power of the analyses 
and provide a good source of diversity to the overall sample. Statistical tests were performed to 
identify whether any variables were related to scores on effort tests within an overall non­
litigating brain injury population (Fisher’s exact/Likelihood ratio tests based on categorical 
groupings of variables, ANOVAs based on categorical groupings and scaled scores, and 
Correlations between scaled scores). Fourth, differences in effort test failure rates between the 
three participant groups were also analysed where appropriate. Fifth, the relationships between 
the various tests of effort will be discussed, and finally, theoretically everyone apart from people 
with the most extreme impairments of memory and learning should pass the WMT based on the 
information put forward by the test authors. Therefore, any person that fails the WMT is 
illuminating and an in-depth case by case analysis is carried out to examine individuals scoring 
below the effort test cut-offs.
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3.2. Data screening and preparation
Prior to analysis, data were screened for outliers and missing values. Demographic data was 
available for all participants. However, in addition to the selective battery administered to the 
Inpatient group, a number of participants were identified as having partial effort test, injury or 
neuropsychological data. For example, two participants were unable to complete particular 
effort measures (one person could not complete the Digit-Symbol Coding test due to manual 
dexterity issues, and one person could not complete the Mental Control test due to a stutter), 
Two participants were also withdrawn part way through assessment based on clinical 
judgement, and one participant voluntarily withdrew before completion of all the tasks. In 
addition, some WTAR scores were not computed because the discrepancy between observed 
and predicted scores was too great for scores to be reliable. Table 10 provides information 
regarding missing data and outliers.
Table 10: Total amount of participant data available per variable, and the number of 
outliers identified within each variable
Variable Total number of cases available
Number of outliers 
identified
WMT-IR 47/47 1
WMT-DR 45/47 1
WMT-CR 45/47 1
MC 34/36 0
DS-C 33/36 1
AMI 34/36 0
CMTF 34/36 1
C-I-H 36/36 4
Effort Questions 34/36 2
Pre-morbid IQ 40/47 0
Processing Speed 34/36 0
Anxiety 47/47 0
Depression 47/47 0
WMT-MC 34/36 0
WMT-PA 34/36 2
WMT-FR 34/36 0
GCS 8/31 0
Education * 47/47 3
Age 47/47 0
Time since 
injury/diagnosis
47/47 0
Note: Table contains information regarding the number of cases of missing 
data per variable, along with the number of cases identified as outliers across 
the demographic, injury, psychological, neuropsychological and effort 
variables.
Outlying scores were retained because such scores are of interest to the present research and are 
important to consider within the analyses. Removing outliers of this nature would reduce the 
external validity of the analyses, as they represent a specific part of the population distribution.
All outliers were identified using box plots, therefore, any scores that were 1.5 times or greater 
than the interquartile range were considered to be outlying.
3.3 Description of Statistical Analyses
Multiple approaches to data analyses were employed to investigate the relationships between 
effort test scores and explanatory demographic, injury, and psychological variables. Due to the 
design of the effort tests and the nature of the brain injury sample, it was predicted that some 
variables would not be normally distributed. Tests for skewness and kurtosis were applied and 
accepted if they fell between the standard of +/- 1 (Miller, 1984). The Kolmogrov-Smimov test 
of normality was also applied if any of the skewness and kurtosis tests were marginal. The 
variables of years of education, months since injury, WMT-IR, C-I-H, and AMI were not 
normally distributed.
Some continuous variables were divided into discrete categories based on the median value of 
the variables (including IQ, Age, SoIP scores and WMT memory scores). Other continuous 
variables were divided into categories based on clinical appropriateness (e.g. Anxiety and 
Depression scores were split based on those who scored below and above the cut-off for 
caseness, and education was divided based on those who obtained GCSEs at grade C and above, 
and those who scored below this or did not receive any qualifications),
Effort test pass/fail rates were cross-tabulated with binomial demographic, injury, psychological 
and neuropsychological test scores to identify any differences between those who passed and 
failed effort tests. To use chi-square tests on categorical data the expected frequencies in each 
cell must be greater than five. However, in the current data this was not observed due to the 
variance in pass and fail rates across effort tests. Therefore, Fisher’s exact tests or Likelihood 
ratios were employed. The majority of reported scores are two-sided Fisher’s exact tests, 
However, Likelihood ratio has been reported where the brain injury group variable has been 
employed (for three groups).
A series of one-way ANOVAs were also performed using the scale scores from the effort 
variables and dichotomous demographic, psychological and neuropsychological measures, in 
order to provide additional information about the relationships between effort scores and the 
independent variables. Where Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was p<0.05 Welch’s F 
statistic is reported. Post-hoc tests were performed using Hochberg’s GT2 calculations. All 
ANOVA findings based on non-normally distributed variables were also supported by the 
Kruskal Wallis and Mann Whitney U test calculations.
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Two-tailed Pearson’s r correlations were calculated where variables were normally distributed, 
and Spearman’s rho correlations are reported when the variable was not normally distributed. A 
point-biserial correlation was performed for the dichotomous variables of gender and 
handedness. Correlations were not performed on variables that contained small numbers of 
ordinal categories, which includes the participant sampling groups, and this must also be taken 
into account when interpreting the C-I-H and AMI variables due to the limited number of 
different scores. However, Jaccard and Wan (1996) highlight that, "for many statistical tests, 
rather severe departures (from intervalness) do not seem to affect Type I and Type II errors 
dramatically" (p. 4). Therefore, where judgements about the ordinal or interval level of 
measurement was unclear, data were assumed to be interval.
Due to the number of analyses carried out, there was also an increased risk of Type 1 error, 
Therefore, Bonferroni corrections were applied as appropriate. However, the findings of the 
current research are exploratory and preliminary in nature; therefore uncorrected significance 
levels are also given consideration.
All analyses were performed using SPSS computer package for Windows, Version 16.
3.3.1 Effort test data
This thesis aimed to examine the base rate incidence of effort test failure in a non-litigating 
brain injury population. To this end, the examination of the distribution of scores on the various 
effort tests and the rate at which people failed these tests forms the critical analysis for this 
thesis. To examine these issues, the descriptive statistics for each of the effort tests is considered 
(see Table 11) and the failure rates (according to test manuals and validation research) across 
the effort tests is described (see Table 12). To foreshadow these results, a wide range of 
performances were displayed by the participants; with failure rates of between 2.8% to 38.9% 
depending on the test
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for all of the effort tests used in the current study
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Effort
Test Mean S.D Median IQR
Absolute
Range
WMT-IR 88.5 12.2 90.0 85.0 - 97.5 42.5 -100.0
WMT-DR 90.0 9.1 92.5 85.0 - 97.5 65.0-100.0
C-I-H 9.7 1.0 10.0 10.0 -10.0 5.0 - 10.0
MC 19.1 7.3 19.0 12.8-25.5 8.0 - 36.0
DS-C 5.8 2.0 6.0 4.5 - 7.0 2.0 -12.0
AMI 10.1 1.1 11.0 9.0-11.0 8.0-11.0
CMTF 21.2 3.7 22.0 18.8-24.0 12.0-25.0
Table 11 shows that the mean and median for all effort tests falls above the established cut-offs 
for failure. However, the standard deviation and range indicate large variation between these 
scores, particularly within the Immediate Recognition trial; where the two participants whose 
test administrations were terminated early obtained the two lowest scores. In addition, although 
above the cut-off scores provided in the manual (Green, 2003), the mean and S.D of the WMT- 
IR and WMT-DR are different to those reported by Green and Allen (1999) as part of the WMT 
validation using people with moderate to severe brain injuries. Green and Allen (1999) report 
that the WMT-IR mean was 95.5% (S.D = 5.1) and the WMT-DR mean was 96.1% (S.D = 3.9) 
in their population.
When broken down into pass and fail rates across all participants Table 12 shows that failures 
have occurred across all of the effort tests. Based on the assumption that all participants in the 
current research were genuine clinical patients with no incentive to feign their impairments, then 
the number of false positive results in this sample produces unacceptable specificity rates for all 
but the C-I-H test (i.e. <90%; Baker et al., 2000).
Table 12: Pass and fail rates of all participants on tests of effort used in the current 
research
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Effort test Pass Fail Missing
WMT-IR 37 (78.7%) 10(21.3%) 0 (0.0%)
WMT-DR 37 (78.7%) 8 (17.0%) 2 (4.3%)
C-I-H 34 (94.4%) 1 (2.8%) 1 (2.8%)
MC 25 (69.4%) 9 (25.0%) 2 (5.6%)
DS-C 25 (69.4%) 8 (22.2%) 3 (8.3%)
AMI 20 (55.5%) 14 (38.9%) 2 (5.6%)
CMTF 28 (77.8%) 6 (16.7%) 2 (5.6%)
Although failure on the C-I-H test was uncommon (2.8% of the overall sample), failures on 
other tests of effort were more marked, with rates ranging from 16.7% to 38.9%. Therefore, the 
base rate incidence of failure within the current non-litigating clinical sample of people with 
brain injuries is higher than that suggested by the authors of the measures, particularly the 
claims put forward regarding the performance of the WMT. For example, 12 of the 47 
participants failed at least one WMT effort measure (25.5%), while the WMT-IR failure rate of 
21.3% and WMT-DR failure rate of 17.0% is much higher than that suggested by Green (2003), 
who proposes that “there are very few “false positives”, with the exception of people with 
dementia” (p. 9, quote in original). However, as described below, this finding is also likely to be 
a conservative estimate of the numbers who are usually considered to be failing on the WMT.
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3.3.2 WMT Consistency, Caution and Warning Data
As outlined in the Method section, in addition to providing pass and fail rates, the WMT output 
also provides a ‘caution’ rating for the Immediate Recognition and Delayed Recognition trials, 
as well as using the WMT Consistency Rating as a measure of effort. The WMT-MC and 
WMT-PA scores are also provided with a ‘pass’ or ‘warning’ label. The authors of the WMT 
state that they have included such labels in an attempt to draw the assessor’s attention to scores 
which could potentially indicate feigning. A breakdown of these additional scores within the 
current research can be found in Table 13.
Table 13: Total numbers o f ‘cautions’ and 'warnings' across the WMT measures split by 
participant subgroup
Participant Subgroup
Community Inpatient Epilepsy Total
WMT-1R
Fail 6 3 0 9/47
Caution 4 2 3 9/47
Total 10 5 3 18/47
WMT-DR
Fail 4 2 1 7/45
Caution 6 1 3 10/45
Total 10 3 4 17/45
WMT-CR
Fail 8 3 3 14/45
Caution 4 4 3 11/45
Total 12 7 6 25/45
WMT-MC
Warning 14 - 8 22/34
WMT-PA
Warning 12 - 5 17/34
Twelve of 47 participants failed either the WMT-IR or the WMT-DR (25.5%), but if the 
Consistency Rating was also included as a measure of effort then 19 of the 47 participants 
included in the current research would have failed at least one WMT effort measure. This 
equates to a 40.4% failure rate on the WMT across a non-litigating brain injury population.
When including the ‘cautions’ within the current calculations then 23 of the 47 participants 
obtained a caution or fail on either the WMT-IR or WMT-DR effort measures (48.9%), and if 
the Consistency Ratings are also added to these scores then the number of participants who have 
scores supposedly indicative of poor effort rises to 29 of the 47 participants. This gives a very 
large potential poor effort rate of 61.7% within the current research.
Within the memory measures, 14 participants score in the ‘warning’ range on the WMT-MC, 
and 12 score in the ‘warning’ range on the WMT-PA. According to Green (2003) scores in this 
range “would be very suspicious, except in someone with dementia or profound amnesia” (p, 
11). However, the sample in the current research did not have dementia, and although many of 
the sample have memory problems it is unlikely that many would attract a classification of 
‘profound’ as it would be considered in line with dementia.
According to Green (2003), a caution on the WMT-IR and WMT-DR is still two S.D below the 
normal adult mean and one S.D below the mean for people with severe brain injuries, and a 
warning on the memory measures is in most cases suggestive of poor effort. As these scores 
were treated as passes throughout the current analyses it is likely that the findings provide a 
conservative estimate of the performance of the WMT across the current sample of participants 
and of the relationships between the WMT and the other variables included in the research.
Another feature of note within the WMT data is that some participants also scored lower on the 
Immediate Recognition trial of the WMT than on the Delayed Recognition trial, indicating 
counterintuitive scores. Four participants in the Inpatient group, five participants in the 
Community group, and four participants in the Epilepsy group had higher scores on the Delayed 
trial compared to the Immediate trial,
3.3.3 Pass/fail rates on effort tests across participant subgroups
Given that a substantial amount of people in the current research failed effort tests, where the 
authors of such tests suggest that failure rates should be low or zero, it was of interest to see 
whether the groups differed in regard to base rate failure. To analyse this, the sample was 
divided into its separate diagnostic groups.
As can be seen in Table 14 the Community participants failed the AMI at much higher rates 
than the Epilepsy subgroup; none of the Epilepsy participants failed this test, whereas a 
substantial proportion of the Community participants did fail. This difference was statistically 
significant (Fishers; p<.001). When scaled scores were analysed this finding remained 
significant (F[l, 19.02]=37.152, p<.001), with Community participants significantly more likely 
to have lower scores compared to the Epilepsy participants. This pattern of results was also 
found in relation to the Camden Memory Test for Faces (F[l, 32]=9.433, p=.004), with 
Community participants again having significantly lower scores than the Epilepsy participants.
Although not significant, some trends in differential failure rates on effort tests were observed. 
Within the WMT-IR, failure rates in the Community and Inpatient samples were 30% (6/20
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people) and 27.3% (3/11 people) respectively, whereas only 6.2% (1/16 people) failed in the 
Epilepsy group (p=.223). When analysed based on scaled scores, this non-significant trend was 
also observed (F[2, 44]=2.684, p=.079), with post hoc Hochberg’s GT2 tests identifying the 
main differences as between the Community and Epilepsy samples (p=.079).
Within the WMT-DR condition, approximately 20% of people failed in the Community (4/18 
people) and Inpatient (2/10 people) subgroups, compared to 12.5% (2/16) in the Epilepsy 
subgroup (p=.786), but scaled score calculations were not found to be significant (F[2, 
44]=0.980, p=.374).
Overall failure rates on the WMT were 35% in the Community subgroup, 27.3% in the Inpatient 
subgroup, and 18.8% in the Epilepsy subgroup.
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Table 14: Failure rates on effort tests across all participant groups
Effort Community Epilepsy Inpatient
Test Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail
WMT-IR 14 6 15 1 8 3
(70%) (30%) (93.8%) (6.2%) (72.7%) (27.3%)
WMT-DR 15 4 14 2 8 2
(78.5%) (21.1%) (87.5%) (12.5%) (72.7%) (18.2%)
C-I-H 19 1 15 1 -
(95%) (5%) (93.8%) (6.2%)
MC 14 5 11 4 -
(73.7%) (26.3%) (73.3%) (26.7%)
DS-C 13 4 12 4 -
(65%) (20%) (75%) (25%)
AMI 4 14 16 0 -
(22.2%) (77.8%) (100%) (0%)
CMTF 13 5 15 1 -
(72.2%) (27.8%) (93.8%) (6.2%)
Figure 6 shows the total number of effort test failures across all participants, again highlighting 
that people with legitimate brain injuries and no incentive to feign do fail effort tests at rates 
used to identify malingering. It can be seen from Figure 6 that 30/47 participants failed at least 
one effort test, and five participants failed three or more of the tests, despite the fact that only 
two effort tests were administered to the Inpatient group and some participants did not complete 
all of their testing.
Figure 5: The total number of effort test fails across all participants in the current 
research
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Based on the Slick et al. (1999) criteria for ‘probable’ malingering, part of identifying people in 
this category involves two or more types of evidence from neuropsychological tests, including 
where “well-validated psychometric tests or indices designed to measure exaggeration or 
fabrication of cognitive deficits is consistent with feigning” (p. 553), and where the test data are 
discrepant with known patterns of neuropsychological functioning. Therefore, at least 12 of the 
current participants would potentially have met the criteria for probable malingering if they had 
an identifiable external incentive, and doubts would be raised regarding 63.8% of the total 
sample with regard to effort.
3.3.4 Relationships between effort tests and explanatory variables
As identified in Table 15, although calculations were not performed using C-I-H scores due to 
the low rates of failure, statistical analyses did reveal several significant results between 
categorical demographic and injury variables and pass/fail rates on the effort tests at the p<0.05 
level.
Table 15: Fisher’s exact test and Likelihood ratio significance levels for effort test scores 
and demographic/injury variables
51
WMT
IR
WMT
DR MC DS-C AMI
CMTF
Age .480 .269 1.00 .031* 1.00 .638
Hand .424 1.00 .348 1.00 1.00 1.00
Gender .704 .689 .692 .673 1.00 1.00
Education .227 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .653
Time .724 .135 1.00 1.00 .098 .641
SoIP .335 1.00 .118 .001* .688 .175
Anxiety 1.00 1.00 1.00 .416 .689 .364
Depression .679 .382 .017* .643 1.00 .609
IQ .480 .410 .354 .055 .375 .268
Group .223 .786 1.00 1.00 <.001* .180
WMT-MC .046* .340 .699 1.00 .233 .180
WMT-PA .044* .335 .688 1.00 .225 .656
WMT-FR .053 .355 .242 .416 .053 .672
* significant at the p <.05 level
Failure rates on the Mental Control test were found to be related to depression scores; with 
62.5% of those who reached the clinical cut-off for depression failing this test compared to 
15.4% of those who scored below the cut-off (Fisher’s; p=.017). When based on scaled scores, 
the relationship between scores on the Mental Control test and depression was again confirmed 
(F[l, 32]=6.248, p=.018), with people who were above the cut-off for depression having 
significantly lower scores on the Mental Control task. A further relationship was also identified 
between the Mental Control test and processing speed, with those in the slower processing 
speed group having lower scores on Mental Control (F[l, 31]=7.914, p=.008).
The findings for Mental Control were also confirmed through correlations, with lower scores 
related to higher depression levels (r=-.455, p=.007) and lower processing speed (r=.462, 
p=.007). In addition several other variables were correlated with the scaled scores on this effort 
test. Specifically, more years of education (rho=.411, p=.016), lower pre-morbid IQ (r=-.496, 
P=.006), and higher anxiety (r=.462, p=.007), although education was not significant once a 
Bonferroni correction was applied.
The Digit Symbol-Coding test was also found to be related to age (Fisher’s; p=.031) and speed 
of processing (p=.001), with all of the failures occurring in those who were in the younger 
group and the slower processing speed group. The relationship between Digit Symbol-Coding 
and processing speed was confirmed via ANO VA (F[l,31]=24.267, p<.001) and correlations 
(r=.569, p<.001), with significantly lower Digit Symbol-Coding scores observed in the group 
with slower processing speed. However, the identified relationship between Digit Symbol-
Coding and age was not supported when related to scaled scores rather than pass and fail rates, 
although the findings did approach significance (F[l, 31]=3.061, p=.090).
Although not significant when applying categorical scores or ANOVAs, higher scores on the 
AMI effort test were found to correlate with longer time since injury/diagnosis (rho=.459, 
p=.006) and lower processing speed (rho=.354, p=.040), although the relationship with 
processing speed was no longer significant once the Bonferroni correction was applied. Age was 
also found to be correlated with scores on the WMT-IR (rho=-.304, p=.038), with people who 
were younger scoring lower on this effort test. Scores on the WMT-DR were also related to 
lower processing speed (r=.377, p=.020). However, these findings also did not remain 
significant once the Bonferroni correction was applied.
A relationship between failure rates on the WMT-Immediate Recognition trial and low memory 
scores on the WMT-Multiple Choice test (Fisher’s p=.046) and WMT-Paired Associates test 
(Fisher’s p=.044) was identified, and the relationship with the WMT-Free Recall test 
approached significance (Fisher’s p=.053). Overall, those who failed the Immediate Recognition 
trial scored in the lower group on the memory measures of the WMT, and this trend was also 
observed for the Delayed Recognition trial, but did not reach significance.
When analyses were based on scaled scores statistically significant relationships were also 
identified between the WMT memory scores and several of the effort tests. As Table 16 shows, 
participants in the WMT-Multiple Choice low score group had significantly lower scores on the 
Immediate and Delayed Recognition trials of the WMT, along with lower scores on the Camden 
Memory Test for Faces. These relationships were also supported by correlations (WMT-IR; 
rho=.809, p<.001, WMT-DR; r=.714, p<.001, CMTF; r=.555, p=.001). Further, the WMT- 
Multiple Choice low score group was found to be related to significantly lower scores on the 
Autobiographical Memory Index, and this was highlighted in the correlations (rho=.367, 
p=.033) although when the Bonferroni correction was applied this became non-significant.
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Table 16: ANOVA analyses for WMT memory measures and effort test scores
Effort Test WMT-MC WMT-PA WMT-FR
F Df Sig. F df Sig. F Df Sig.
WMT-IR 19.649 1.32 <.001* 46.059 1,24 <.001* 12.397 1,32 .001*
WMT-DR 23.542 1,32
*©oV 19.440 1.32 <.001* 4.010 1.32 .054
C-I-H 0.579 1,32 .452 0.030 1-32 .864 0.422 1,32 .520
MC 0.710 1,31 .406 0.663 1,31 .422 2.131 1,31 .154
DS-C 0.092 1,31 .763 0.521 1.31 .476 0.026 1.31 .936
AMI 6.442 1.27 .017* 2.907 1.28 .100 2.245 1,32 .144
CMTF 6.107 1.28 .020* 8.519 1.32 .006* 2.538 1.28 .121
* significant at the p <.05 level
Table 16 also shows that participants in the WMT-Paired Associate low score group had 
significantly lower scores on the Camden memory Test for Faces and the Immediate and 
Delayed Recognition trials on the WMT. These relationships were supported by correlations 
between the scaled scores on these variables (WMT-IR; rho=.852 p<.001, WMT-DR; r=.683, 
p<.001, CMTF; r=.571, p=.001). Additional relationships were also identified via correlations 
between the Autobiographical Memory Index and the WMT-Paired Associates test (rho=.450, 
p=,008) and WMT-Free Recall test (rho=.373, p=.030), but again this last relationship was not 
significant once it had been Bonferroni corrected.
Further, the WMT-Free Recall low score group was related to significantly lower scores on the 
WMT-Immediate Recognition trial (see Table 16), and this was confirmed via correlations 
(rho=.686, p<.001). Additional significant relationships were also identified when WMT-Free 
Recall test scores were correlated with Mental Control (r=.357, p=.041) and the Delayed 
Recognition trial of the WMT (r=.466, p=.006), but the relationship with Mental Control did not 
remain significant once the Bonferroni correction had been applied,
3.3.5 Relationships between all effort tests
As part of the validation process for psychometric measures the validity of the measure must be 
assessed. A common way of assessing whether a particular test is measuring the construct it is 
supposed to measure (in this case ‘effort’) is to see how well it relates to other tests purportedly 
measuring the same construct. Therefore, the effort tests used in the current research were 
analysed to identify any relationships between them.
A number of the effort tests did display statistically significant relationships, with failures on 
some of the tests relating to failure rates on other tests. However, although this trend was 
observed across all tests of effort, some of the results were non-significant and the inconsistency
of the identified relationships across the tests also indicates differential rates of specificity. 
Table 17 includes the Fisher’s exact test significance levels across all effort tests.
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Table 17: Fisher’s exact test significance levels for all effort tests
WMT
IR
WMT
DR C-I-H MC DS-C
AMI
WMT-DR .002*
C-I-H .200 .176
MC .031* .031* .273
DS-C .078 .078 .250 .047*
AMI .007* .570 .250 .366 .366
CMTF .029* .205 .242 .020* .020* .126
♦significant at the p <.05 level
As expected, correlations between the scaled effort test scores also supported several of the 
identified relationships between categorical pass/fail rates. Table 17 shows the interrelationships 
between all effort test scaled scores, and highlights that higher scores on effort tests relate to 
higher scores on other effort tests. There was a 26.49% chance of finding one or more 
significant differences within the six tests that were performed for each effort variable. When 
Bonferroni corrections were employed the alpha level was reduced to p<0.009 for a significant 
result. Significant correlations between five of the eight cases remained once this correction had 
been applied.
Again, it can be seen that there is differential strength in the identifiable relationships between 
the tests and not all of the measures are significantly related to one another. Some of the 
correlations also contradict the significant results identified based on the categorical pass/fail 
data, with the previously identified relationships between the Camden Memory Test for Faces 
and the Digit Symbol-Coding and Mental Control tests failing to reach significance, and 
additional relationships being identified between the Camden Memory Test for Faces and the 
Autobiographical Memory Index.
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Table 18: Correlations and significance levels between all effort test scores
IR
WMT
DR C-I-H MC DS-C AMI
WMT-DR .757
<.001**
C-I-H .110 .210
.522 .226
MC .354 .411 .221
.040* .016* .210
DS-C .054 .216 .340 .580
.765 .227 .053 <001**
AMI .344 288 .266 .234 .325
.047* .098 .128 .190 .065
CMTF .473 .505 .319 .194 .325 .560
.005** .002** .066 .279 .065 .001**
*significant at the p<.05 level 
‘ ♦significant at the Bonferroni corrected level.
These analyses provide an indication of the construct validity of the effort measures, with not all 
measures correlating with each other. The Immediate and Delayed Recognition trials of the 
WMT also display differing relationships regarding the other effort tests.
3.4 Individual Data Inspection
The following section provides a breakdown of individual findings from a selection of 
participants who failed effort tests. Brief background information on the participant is described, 
along with their pattern of scores on the tests and qualitative information recorded by the 
researcher regarding their performance across the testing session.
The variables of WMT-IR, C-I-H and AMI are not normally distributed, therefore the z scores 
for these variables are likely to be skewed. However, the z-score is ultimately a descriptive 
measure for identifying how the person performs relative to everyone else in the sample. It is 
fairly robust and the SPSS calculations include the results from the individual when calculating 
the scores, which should alter the z-scores closer to 0 and actually provide a more conservative 
estimation.
Anxiety and Depression z-scores have been reversed in order to make interpretation easier, as 
high scores on both of these measures indicate more difficulty in these areas, whereas higher 
scores on the other measures indicate better performance.
56
3.4.1 Community Participants
Community Participant 1
This 36 year old female was educated to NVQ level and obtained a brain injury in 2002 as a 
result of a hypoglycaemic coma and possible alcohol abuse. The damage to her brain was 
recorded in her notes as widespread atrophy. During testing her processing speed was slow, as 
was her overall reaction to questions. The extent of this bradyphrenia meant that she often 
required that questions be repeated before she understood the nature of the tasks, and in 
comparison to other participants it took a relatively long time to complete all tests. The staff 
working with her also felt she was on a lot of medication and it was suggested that these drugs 
could be interacting or at a level high enough to induce a sedative effect Table 19 provides a 
breakdown of this participant’s scores across the whole range of administered tests.
Table 19: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for community participant 1
Measure ObtainedScore z-score
Percentile
Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 81 -1.47 7
Anxiety 10 -1.34 9
Depression 12 -1.29 10
Processing Speed 19 -1.73 4
WMT-CR 70 -1.26 5
WMT-MC 35 -1.80 4
WMT-PA 25 -1.33 9
WMT-FR 5 -1.54 6
WMT-IR 80 (fail) -0.32 37
WMT-DR 75 (fail) -1.64 5
C-I-H 9 (pass) -0.70 24
MC 10 (fail) -1.27 10
DS-C 3 (fail) -1.44 7
AMI 8 (fail) -1.84 3
CMTF 12 (fail) -2.62 0
As can be seen in Table 19, scores on all tests were much lower in comparison to the overall 
sample, with her speed of processing and Camden Memory Test for Faces scores being the 
lowest across all participants. In addition, although her Autobiographical Memory Index score is 
low, it was also in line with four of the other Community participants who all got the same 
answers wrong; specifically their address, telephone number, and what they had for breakfast 
that morning and dinner the night before. Such memory difficulties are not uncommon in this 
sample, and struggling to remember such information is also likely to reflect the transient nature 
of their stay in rehabilitation housing.
As can be seen from Figure 7 below, this participant was well below the normal adult scores and 
those with moderate to severe brain damage who pass the WMT, falling between 4 and 6 S.D 
below the mean for these two groups. Although her scores are more in line with people with a 
moderate to severe brain injury who fail the WMT, Green (2003) automatically views these 
people as putting in insufficient effort because they fail the task and are in litigation.
This participant’s subjective reports of how much effort she was able to put in was also 
representative of her overall scores. She stated that she was only able to put in 40% effort, and 
gave the reasons as her ‘brain not being as good as it used to be’ and that she would have done 
better if she ‘had a clearer head and a better memory’.
Figure 6: Graph of performance on the WMT for community participant 1
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Community Participant 2
This 44 year old man was educated to GCSE level before being involved in a road traffic 
accident in 1995. The resulting evidence of episodic dyscontrol was reported as consistent with 
contusional damage to the right temporal lobe. During testing the participant was distractible 
and found it difficult to maintain attention, and the background noise in the testing environment 
(the participant’s home) was also likely to impact on the participant’s performance.
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As can be seen in Table 20, scores on all tests were much lower in comparison to the overall 
sample, with consistency in his choices across the WMT-IR and WMT-DR being particularly 
low. Analyses of the WMT data also showed that his scores on the Immediate Recognition trial 
were six S.D below, and the Delayed Recognition trial was nine S.D below the normal adult 
mean and those with moderate to severe brain damage who pass the WMT. In addition, all of 
the WMT memory measures were approximately four S.D below the normal adult mean.
The poor performance on the C-I-H test was potentially a social desirability effect, as a staff 
member was visible to the participant during administration, and the participant looked towards 
her and laughed when choosing the wrong answer. However, in contrast to Participant 1, when 
asked the Brief Effort Questionnaire at the end of testing he stated he was able to put in 100%, 
and added that nothing would have helped him to do any better.
Table 20: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for community participant 2
Measure ObtainedScore z-score
Percentile
Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 84 -1.19 3
Anxiety 3 0.81 79
Depression 0 1.22 89
Processing Speed 36 -0.81 21
WMT-CR 47.5 -3.17 0
WMT-MC 40 -1.52 7
WMT-PA 25 -1.33 9
WMT-FR 7.5 -1.41 8
WMT-IR 72.5 (fail) -0.81 21
WMT-DR 65 (fail) -2.74 0
C-I-H 5 (fail) -4.88 0
MC 8 (fail) -1.55 6
DS-C 3 (fail) -0.93 18
AMI 8 (fail) -1.84 3
CMTF 16 (fail) -1.46 7
Community Participant 3
As the result of a fall in 2002, this 44 year old man sustained diffuse brain damage, with focal 
damage particularly noted in the frontal brain regions. He was educated to GCSE level prior to 
his brain injury. During testing he struggled to keep his attention on the tasks. He said the words 
out loud on WMT when viewing the first presentation, and also became distracted during parts 
of the second viewing of the word list, commenting throughout about how many he thought he 
could remember. He also struggled to understand some of the instructions during the testing
session, particularly the more lengthy instructions on tasks such as Digit Symbol-Coding, unless 
they were presented several times and in manageable chunks.
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Table 21: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for community participant 3
Measure Obtained Score z-score
Percentile
Rank
Pre-morbid IQ Not reliable - -
Anxiety 7 -0.15 44
Depression 7 -0.54 29
Processing Speed 36 -0.37 36
WMT-CR 65 -1.69 5
WMT-MC 35 -1.80 4
WMT-PA 15 -1.79 4
WMT-FR 17.5 -0.87 19
WMT-IR 75 (fail) -0.64 26
WMT-DR 85 (caution) -0.55 29
C-I-H 10 (pass) 0.35 64
MC 11 (fail) -1.13 13
DS-C 3 (fail) -1.44 7
AMI 8 (fail) -1.84 3
CMTF 13 (fail) -2.33 1
As can be seen from Table 21 and Figure 8, this participant found some of the memory 
components of the WMT particularly difficult, with performance approximately five S.D below 
the normal adult mean. Performance on the Camden Memory Test for Faces was also poor. 
Although scores on the Immediate Recognition trial were below the established cut-off and fell 
approximately six S.D below the normal adult mean (as well as those with a severe TBI who 
pass the WMT used in the validation studies), he was able to perform relatively well on the 
Delayed Recognition trial of the WMT. When asked how much effort he was able to put in he 
stated 100%, and could not think of anything that would have helped his performance.
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Figure 7: Graph of performance on the WMT for community participant 3
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Community Participants 4 and 5
Both of these participants had their testing session stopped by the researcher based on the 
protocol outlined in appendix 5.4, and Table 22 provides a breakdown of the participants’ scores 
across the tests that were completed.
Table 22: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for community participants 4 
and 5
Measure
Participant 4
Obtained„ z-score Score
Percentile
Rank
Participant 5
Obtained0 z-score Score
Percentile
Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 114 1.61 95 105 0.75 78
Anxiety 0 1.52 6 7 -0.15 44
Depression 0 1.22 11 7 -0.54 29
WMT-CR n/a - - 62.5 1.90 97
WMT-IR 42.5 (fail) 2.76 100 50 (fail) 2.27 99
WMT-DR n/a - - 77.5 (fail) 1.37 91
C-I-H 10 (pass) 0.35 64 9 (pass) 0.69 75
MC n/a - - 9 (fail) 1.41 97
Participant 4 was a 66 year old male who had a brain haemorrhage in 1999 followed by a further 
haemorrhage in 2002. A CT brain scan conducted in 1999 revealed no specific local 
abnormality, but generalised brain shrinkage was noted, and the intracerebral haemorrhage in 
2002 resulted in damage to the right frontal lobe. The participant was educated to GCSE level, 
but worked up to a high level in his chosen career, reflecting his relatively high pre-morbid IQ 
of 114. His scores at floor level on the Anxiety and Depression measures are also likely to 
reflect Rogers (2008a) ‘impression management’ response strategy, as he was known to be the 
type of man who did not like to show weakness or emotional vulnerability.
During testing the participant became extremely agitated by the direct feedback from the WMT 
when he incorrectly identified an item, stating that ‘the test must be wrong’, and he failed to 
focus attention on the next trials as he became more agitated. The scores for most of the WMT- 
IR therefore likely reflected Rogers (2008a) ‘random responding’ response style. The researcher 
halted the administration of the WMT after the WMT-IR, and administered the C-I-H to help 
the participant regain a sense of control (as this test was judged as simple enough to provide the 
participant with an opportunity to answer correctly).
Participant 5 was a 45 year old male who acquired a frontal brain injury after a fall in 2000. The 
participant was educated to GCSE level and had a pre-morbid IQ level within the average range. 
This participant was extremely slow at filling in the consent information and questionnaire 
measure, despite understanding what was required. He continually attempted to engage the 
examiner in conversation, and often went off at a tangent when the examiner tried to bring the 
participant back to the task. As testing progressed the participant also became increasingly 
anxious before the onset of each test, stating that he was 'worried about what I will have to do'. 
He also struggled to maintain his attention as the testing went on, and administration was 
eventually halted when the participant became distressed by the level of anxiety about what he 
would have to do next.
As can be seen in Table 22, the z-scores and percentile ranks indicate poor performance for both 
participants on the majority of the tests they completed, and both participants displayed 
behaviour typically associated with a frontal brain injury throughout the testing sessions. 
However, both participants were able to pass the Coin-In-hand test
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3.4.2 Inpatient Participants
Inpatient Participant 6
Inpatient Participant 6 was a 57 year old male who left school with no qualifications. He was 
tested 2 months post injury following a diagnosis of Endocarditis with accompanying multiple 
cerebral embolisms. His medical notes recorded diffuse damage across both hemispheres, with 
small areas of acute infarction within multiple vascular territories. During testing the participant 
was clearly very anxious about his current situation and about his performance on the measures, 
and as can be seen in Table 23, his very high scores on measures of Anxiety and Depression 
supported this observation. He also found it difficult to focus on the task and seemed unsure 
about the answers he was providing, although he repeatedly stated that he was happy to help.
Table 23: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for inpatient participant 6
Measure ObtainedScore z-score
Percentile
Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 82 -1.38 8
Anxiety 20 -3.25 0
Depression 20 -3.81 0
WMT-IR 77.5 (fail) -0.89 19
WMT-DR 75 (fail) -1.64 5
WMT-CR 77.5 (fail) -0.63 26
Figure 9 also provides a breakdown of the participant’s scores on the WMT. Only the first three 
measures are provided because the Inpatient sample were not administered the memory 
components of the WMT. As can be seen from Figure 8, the WMT-Immediate Recognition 
score is well below that which would be expected from both a normal population and a brain 
injured population, falling more than four S.D below the mean, and the WMT-Delayed 
Recognition trial is more than six S.D below the mean for these groups. The participant is also 
well below the scores obtained from neurological patients tested by the WMT authors as part of 
the validation of the WMT. However, during the half hour gap between administrations the 
participant was engaged in a completely different, but still demanding, task as part of his 
ongoing rehabilitation on the ward. Therefore, it is possible that the Delayed Recognition results 
are poorer than what would be expected from this participant, as the other Inpatient participants 
just had a sedentary break during the half hour gap.
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Figure 8: Graph of performance on the WMT for inpatient participant 6
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This 26 year old woman was tested 2 weeks after a craniotomy and resection of an 
intraventricular central neurocytoma. Her lowest GCS score was recorded as 10. The 
participant was educated to degree level, and she was particularly keen to participate in the 
study and find out about the research. However, she was noticeably distractible, and the 
background noise from the ward likely made this even more difficult for her. Table 24 provides 
a breakdown of the participant’s scores across the administered measures.
Tabic 24: Obtained scores, z-scorcs and percentile ranks for inpatient participant 7
Measure Score z-score
Percentile
Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 99 0.21 58
Anxiety 7 -0.15 44
Depression 5 -0.04 48
WMT-IR 82.5 (fail) -0.43 33
WMT-DR 70 (fail) -2.19 1
WMT-CR 67.5 -1.46 7
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As can be noted from Table 24, her scores on the Delayed Recognition component of the WMT 
were particularly low, which is supportive of the observations regarding her distractibility and 
difficulty focussing on one task for any length of time, particularly with the observed 
background noise. Her score on the Delayed Recognition trial was found to be eight S.D below 
that expected for the normal adult mean and those with moderate to severe brain damage who 
pass the WMT. However, her Anxiety and Depression scores were within the normal range, and 
she seemed relaxed and positive regarding her current situation.
3.4.3 Epilepsy Participants
Epilepsy Participant 8
Epilepsy participant 8 was a 19 year old male who was diagnosed two years ago with a right 
temporal tumour and accompanying generalised seizures. He obtained several GCSEs and a 
BTEC qualification, but was unemployed and living with his parents at the time of testing. He 
did not seem particularly interested in the research and checked his mobile telephone several 
times during the assessment, although when asked by the researcher he stated that he wanted to 
continue and he remained compliant throughout. His self-reported levels of Anxiety and 
Depression were low, but a flatness of affect was noted. As can be seen from Table 25, his 
results on the WMT effort measures reflect these observations of variable performance, with the 
participant just passing the WMT-IR, but going on to fail the WMT-DR.
Table 25: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for epilepsy participant 8
Measure Obtained Score z-score PercentileRank
Pre-morbid IQ Not reliable - -
Anxiety 6 0.09 46
Depression 3 0.47 32
Processing Speed 41 -0.53 30
WMT-CR 67.5 -1.48 7
WMT-MC 60 -0.36 36
WMT-PA 30 -1.10 14
WMT-FR 32.5 -0.05 48
WMT-IR 87.5 (caution) -1.20 11
WMT-DR 70 (fail) -2.19 1
C-I-H 10 (pass) 0.35 64
MC 17 (pass) -0.30 38
DS-C 4 (fail) -0.93 18
AMI 11 (pass) 0.80 79
CMTF 23 (pass) 0.57 72
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The performance of epilepsy participant 8 on the WMT test can also be seen in Figure 10, where 
his scores on the Immediate recognition trial are approximately two S.D below the normal adult 
mean and the mean for people with Epilepsy who pass the WMT, and his scores on the Delayed 
Recognition Trial are approximately eight S.D below the means for these two groups. However, 
his scores are in line with research looking at people with Epileptic seizures who are assumed to 
be putting in poor effort (Drane et al. 2005).
Figure 9: Graph of performance on the WMT for epilepsy participant 8
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The fact that this participant's pre-morbid intellectual functioning could not be estimated is also 
a relatively frequent finding in men of this age group and socio-economic background, as poor 
language skills seem to mask overall intellectual ability. Again, observations support the idea 
that performance could also be reflective of Impression Management or Social Desirability
response styles (Rogers, 2008a).
When asked the Brief Effort Questionnaire at the end of testing, the participant stated that he 
was able to put in 70% effort, and reported that he felt this was because he had only just woken 
up before the researcher arrived. He also stated that it would have been easier for him to 
remember if there had been more pictures, and the implied feeling was taken to be that he was
embarrassed by his current difficulties, and was potentially hiding his fear of performing badly 
behind a veneer of poor application to the tasks.
66
Epilepsy Participant 9
Epilepsy participant 9 was a 31 year old male with no formal qualifications who had attended a 
special school due to his epilepsy. He was diagnosed with a frontal brain tumour at the age of 
three, which was removed, but left the participant with seizures as a result. Over time the 
tumour has developed again, with corresponding increase in symptoms, and the participant had 
also experienced one episode of status epilepticus in childhood.
Table 26 shows that despite slowed processing speed the participant was able to perform well 
on the WMT and obtained full marks on the Camden Memory Test for Faces. However, he 
performed poorly on Mental Control and Digit Symbol-Coding, indicating that scores on these 
measures could also reflect poor education, memory and processing speed. This participant 
displayed some nervousness generally during testing, and potentially some Social Desirability 
effects when filling in the Anxiety and Depression measure. His behaviour during testing was 
sometimes inappropriate; he made several comments about the attractiveness of the researcher 
being responsible for his poor performance.
When asked the Brief Effort Questionnaire at the end the participant indicated that he had put in 
100% to all of the tests completed.
Table 26: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for epilepsy participant 9
Measure Obtained z-score PercentileScore Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 81 -1.47 7
Anxiety 3 0.81 21
Depression 0 1.22 11
Processing Speed 30 -1.13 13
WMT-CR 90 0.43 67
WMT-MC 70 0.21 58
WMT-PA 55 0.04 52
WMT-FR 12.5 -1.14 13
WMT-1R 95 (pass) 0.21 58
WMT-DR 95 (pass) 0.55 71
C-I-H 10 (pass) 0.35 64
MC 8 (fail) -1.55 6
DS-C 4 (fail) -0.98 18
AMI 11 (pass) 0.80 79
CMTF 25 (pass) 1.15 87
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Epilepsy Participant 10
This 23 year old male was educated to GCSE level and had been working prior to the onset of 
partial and secondary generalised seizures five years ago originating from his right temporal 
lobe. As a result of the seizures the participant had experienced several episodes of post-ictal 
psychosis.
Table 27 shows that the participant had fairly high levels of Anxiety and Depression, along with 
a slowed processing speed. Variable performance on the WMT effort measures was also 
observed, although his WMT memory scores were reasonable for this sample. Low scores were 
also obtained on the Mental Control task compared to the rest of the participants.
Table 27: Obtained scores, z-scores and percentile ranks for epilepsy participant 10
Measure Obtained Percentile• Score z-score Rank
Pre-morbid IQ 86 -1.01 16
Anxiety 11 -1.10 86
Depression 10 -1.29 90
Processing Speed 82 1.70 96
WMT-CR 72.5 -1.05 15
WMT-MC 75 0.50 69
WMT-PA 65 0.50 69
WMT-FR 45 0.63 74
WMT-1R 92.5 (pass) -0.26 40
WMT-DR 80 (fail) -1.10 14
C-I-H 10 (pass) 0.35 64
MC 11 (fail) -1.13 13
DS-C 5 (pass) -0.42 34
AMI 11 (pass) 0.80 79
CMTF 22 (pass) 0.28 61
Observation at testing indicated a flatness of affect, but he completed all of the tasks. When 
asked the questions from the Brief Effort Questionnaire about how much effort he felt he had 
been able to put in to the tasks he stated 60%, and when questioned further he alluded to 
possible family difficulties and arguments prior to my arrival for testing, and that he was not 
entirely comfortable with the atmosphere and his father being in the next room.
Figure 11 shows that this participant’s scores on the WMT-DR fell more than four S.D below 
the normal adult mean and the mean expected in participants with Epilepsy who pass the WMT. 
Although his scores on the memory components of the WMT were relatively in line with what 
is expected of people with seizures.
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Figure 10: Graph of performance on the WMT for epilepsy participant 10
lq
Patient
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3.4.4 Participants Passing Effort Tests
As well as a number of participants failing effort tests within this sample, a number of 
participants also passed despite having impairments in a variety of areas of functioning. For 
example, a 34 year old male Epilepsy participant had temporal lobe seizures originating from 
both the left and right hemispheres, and has significant memory difficulties related to 
Accelerated Forgetting; which is a very rare memory disorder in which the person forgets 
information over a period of days and weeks rather than minutes and hours. This participant’s 
performance across effort tests was good, obtaining 90% for WMT-IR and 87.5% for WMT-DR 
(constituting a ‘caution’ rating) and he passed all other effort measures administered as part of 
the current research.
Another of the participants from the Community sample was a 44 year old male who had been 
in institutionalised care for most of his life after suffering a brain injury at the age of 15, finally 
moving to community based services when in his late 30s. Although he had significant frontal 
brain damage that meant living on his own in the community would be difficult, he was able to 
perform reasonably well on the WM I and other measures included in the current research,
although he still scored below what the manual would predict for the WMT and obtained a 
‘caution’ rating for WMT-DR. Figure 12 shows the results of this participant’s WMT test scores 
and again highlights the necessity to approach scores on effort tests on a case by case basis and 
consider the complex and multifaceted issues that contribute to such scores.
Figure 11: Example graph from a community participant passing the WMT effort 
measures
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3.5 Individual Analyses Summary'
From the individual analyses performed above, participants in the current research were more 
likely to struggle due to anterior brain damage and personality rather than any focal lesions 
affecting areas for memory. The Community participants did particularly poorly, and 
dysexecutive reasons were often implicated, along with potential over-medication and genuine 
deficits.
In addition, distractibility and attentional factors were important in performing well on the tests 
used in the current research, particularly for the Community and Inpatient participants. 
Participants were often focussed on other aspects of the testing situation or environment as well 
as the measures themselves. The people who failed the effort tests from the Epilepsy sample
were also identified as likely to have an Impression Management style of responding rather than 
a deliberate attempt to feign.
Tests based on established measures from neuropsychological batteries are also likely to have 
identified actual damage for most of the participants assessed in the current research, 
particularly difficulties with slowed thinking speed (Digit Symbol-Coding) and memory 
(Camden Memory Test for Faces), rather than measuring just effort in these populations.
3.6 Overall Summary
In relation to the first research question identified in the introduction, the above results reveal 
that the base rate incidence of failure on effort tests in a non-litigating brain injury population is 
substantially higher than that proposed by the authors of effort tests such as the WMT. 
Significant failure rates were identified across most of the effort tests in the current research, 
with rates reaching up to a quarter of the whole sample for some of the measures. Such findings 
are not in line with the proposition that the WMT is “virtually insensitive to all but the most 
extreme forms of impairment of learning and memory” (Green et al. 2002, p. 99), and indicates 
that legitimate patients with the injuries observed in these samples could be at risk of being 
formally identified as possible or probable malingerers based on the Slick et al. (1999) criteria if 
an external incentive for such participants was also identified.
In relation to the second research question, within the overarching non-litigating brain injury 
sample, participant subgroup had a significant impact on the scores obtained across most of the 
injury, psychological, neuropsychological and effort variables. Differential failure rates across 
effort tests were observed, with the implication being that other factors in addition to effort are 
contributing to effort test scores. Statistical analyses then went on to confirm that relationships 
with other explanatory variables were indeed evident in relation to a number of the effort tests 
administered in the current research.
The third research question considered whether any factors in addition to effort could account 
for scores on effort tests, and the data analyses did identify relationships between scores on 
effort measures and the explanatory variables, although such relationships varied widely. Table 
28 highlights the statistically significant relationships identified between the variables in the 
current research.
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Table 28: All significant relationships identified through statistical analyses between effort 
measures and additional explanatory variables in the current research
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cApiäiiaiOry Effort Measures
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DR MC DS-C AMI
CMTF
Age
Hand
Gender
Education
Time since injury
C*
C*
F
C
Processing Speed C* A, C F, A, C C*
Anxiety C
Depression 
Pre-morbid 1<) 
Group
F, A, C 
C
LR, A A
WMT-MC F» A, C A, C A, C* A, C
WMT-PA F, A, C A, C C A, C
WMT-FR A, C C C* C*
F •  Fisher’s Exact Test, LR = Likelihood Ratio, A = ANOVA, C = Correlation, C* = 
Correlation that fails to retain significance once the Bonferroni correction is applied.
Table 28 shows that failures across six of the seven effort tests were related to at least two of the 
additional explanatory variables included in the study, and the findings from one type of 
statistical data analyses were usually supported by findings from other statistical tests (the C-I-H 
test could not be included in the statistical analyses based on the statistical assumptions required 
for such calculations). However, the correlations need to be interpreted with caution due to the 
increased risk of Type I error, and not every type of statistical analyses could be performed on 
each variable due to the nature of the data. In addition, the finding that failure on the tests of 
effort used in this study was not just related to a lack of effort on the part of the participant 
being assessed was also supported by an analysis of individual participant data.
The case study material presented in the results provides more in depth information regarding 
potential reasons for failure among individual participants, with such factors including nature of 
brain injury, memory and processing speed deficits, attention, and impression management 
Further, as can be seen in Table 28, although all the tests were applied as measures of effort, the 
relationships with other variables were not consistent. Different effort tests were related to 
different demographic, injury, psychological and neuropsychological variables, indicating that 
specific effort tests were measuring other constructs in addition to effort. This finding was also 
supported by further data analyses relating to the construct validity of the tests. Some of the 
scores on effort tests showed clear significant relationships with scores on other effort tests, 
which provides support for the contention that the tests are measuring similar things, but this 
was not consistent across every effort test
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DISCUSSION
4.1 Review of Aims
For any neuropsychological testing to be valid people have to put in their best effort, otherwise 
clinicians may conclude that the person has a genuine injury, or is significantly more impaired 
than they actually are, when in fact this is not the case. In an attempt to identify people who may 
be feigning or exaggerating numerous tests of ‘effort’ such as the Word Memory Test have been 
designed, with the authors concluding that such measures are insensitive to genuine impairment 
when using the derived cut-offs (e.g. Green, 2003). However, McCarter et al. (2009) has 
recently found that 35% of clinicians in the UK think that measures of effort are unreliable or 
misclassify people, which indicates that neuropsychologists are wary of the claims made by 
standardised tests. Recent literature has also raised doubts regarding the claims about effort 
tests, and highlights the importance of further research to establish base rates of failure in 
genuine clinical populations (e.g. Merten et al., 2006). Such studies provide further validation of 
effort tests and provide clinicians with data regarding specific groups of patients so that they are 
able to avoid making a Type I error and assuming someone to be feigning or exaggerating their 
injuries when they are not.
In this straightforward and novel study, the base rates of effort test failure in a genuine brain 
injury population with no incentive to feign were investigated, with specific focus on the Word 
Memory Test. The aim was to establish how well such patients performed on the WMT, along 
with several less well established or researched tests of effort. This is the first time that a study 
has set out to investigate failure on a variety of effort tests in people from the UK who either 
have long-standing brain injuries and severe impairments within a community rehabilitation 
setting, inpatients who have recently obtained a head injury, and people with intractable 
epilepsy who have identifiable brain lesions/tumours.
The following section reviews the findings of this research in relation to the initial aims of the 
study and situates them in the context of previous literature regarding effort test performance. 
Firstly, the findings related to the base rates of effort test failure are discussed. A detailed 
examination of the statistical procedures used to investigate the data is then discussed, along 
with the implications of any shortcomings. The strengths and limitations of the study as a whole 
are also considered, in addition to the clinical implications for practice. Finally, directions for 
future research extending from the findings of the current study will be considered.
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4.2 Results from the Current Research
The purpose of the current research was to add to the psychometric validation of the Word 
Memory Test and several other measures of effort by providing data from a clinical sample with 
muted cognitive impairments. Of particular interest were base rates of failure on effort tests, and 
in contrast to previous research the current findings identified unacceptable rates of false 
positives across a wide range of effort tests at the recommended cut-off levels (<90%; Baker et 
al., 2000).
This study provides data from a relatively large clinical sample (N=47) on a number of different 
measures of effort. Mean and median scores across all of the effort tests in this sample were 
above the cut-offs for feigning, indicating that as an overall group this population were able to 
pass effort tests. However, participant variation within the tests was considerable. The results 
indicate that caution is required when interpreting results based on established cut-off scores on 
a significant majority of the tests administered in this research. Specifically, scores below cut­
off were obtained by 25.5% of a genuine clinical sample with no incentive to feign on the 
WMT, despite the fact that such levels of failure are thought to be highly suggestive of poor 
effort and potential feigning. As Green (2003) states “The recognition subtests were designed to 
avoid confusing actual impairment with deliberate exaggeration. They are virtually insensitive 
to all but the most extreme forms of impairment of memory and the range of genuine scores is 
very narrow indeed.” (p. 6). Had the people in the current study been in litigation or had 
ongoing benefits claims then the obtained scores could have been interpreted as evidence of 
feigning or exaggeration based on the Slick et al. (1999) criteria, and the veracity of their claims 
may have been questioned.
Assuming that the effort test failures in the current research are false positive findings, this 
indicates that the rate of inaccurate identification is unacceptably high, which has a significant 
impact on the specificity of the test. Such results challenge Green et al.’s (2002) claim that all 
patients except for 0.02% with **very severe and widespread cognitive impairment” (p. 117) 
pass the WMT. A central claim of the WMT is that it assesses only effort. Therefore, in order to 
support the validation of the WMT and back up the claims made regarding how performance 
should be interpreted, the measure must be demonstrated to be insensitive to genuine 
impairment in actual patients rather than with normal participants asked to simulate deficits. 
However, the findings from the current study suggest that scores on the WMT could also be 
affected by ability rather than just effort
Table 29 includes a comparison of the results quoted in the WMT manual (Green, 2003) and the 
current study, showing that the overall mean scores identified in the current research fell much
below the scores reported by Green (2003). T-test calculations established that all comparisons 
between the current research and Green’s (2003) validation samples were significant at the 
p<.03 level (see table 30 in appendix 5.5). The scores from the present study actually fall within 
Green’s (2003) ‘caution’ ratings rather than a clear pass, which Green reports as one S.D below 
the mean for people with severe brain injuries, and as such are viewed as “doubtful in most 
cases” (Green, 2003; p. 16).
Table 29: Comparison of Green (2003) scores and the scores obtained in the current 
research
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Study WMT-IR WMT-DR
As reported in Moderate-severe brain injuries M = 95.5% M = 96.1%
Green (2003): (N-57) S.D = 5.1 S.D = 3.9
Neurological - impaired memory M = 96.1% M = 94.9%
(N=20) S.D = 3.3 S.D = 5.5
Neurological - normal memory M = 96.2% M = 96.2%
(N=20) S.D = 3.6 S.D = 4.9
Current Genuine brain injury sample M = 88.5% M = 90.0%
Research: (N=47) S.D = 12.2 S.D = 9.1
However, as highlighted in the Introduction, it is unclear how many of the participants included 
in the validation research fail the WMT when they are from a genuine clinical sample with no 
incentive to feign. Green (2003) does not make it clear whether the data from the 57 moderate to 
severe cases who pass the WMT, as cited in the manual, were actually the same patients 
reported in the Green and Allen (1999) study, or indeed the Green et al. (1999) study. Nor does 
the manual state where the people with moderate-severe brain injuries who fail the WMT 
originate from (N=34). If they are all from the same core data set then all of these participants 
were assessed as part of litigation proceedings, but the ones who passed were reported as having 
adequate levels of effort because their brain scans showed actual damage and their claims for 
disability benefits had been accepted (Green et al. 1999). It is possible that the same claims 
could be made regarding the 34 people who failed the WMT, who had mean scores of 82% (S.D 
= 11.1) on the WMT-IR and 82.7% (S.D = 14.3) on the WMT-DR. The standard deviations 
alone indicate wide variation in the scores of this sample of participants.
Further evidence of differential failure rates on the WMT within the literature comes from 
Gorissen, et al. (2005), who found a 10% failure rate on the WMT in their control sample of
neurological patients. Although higher than the rate predicted by Green (2003), this is still 
substantially below the rate of 25.5% found in the current research. Merten et al. (2006) also 
found that all people with genuine brain injuries who did not have ‘clinically obvious 
symptoms’ passed the oral version of the WMT, but a failure rate of 50% on the WMT-IR and 
58% on the WMT-DR was found in 24 participants with clinically obvious symptoms. In 
addition, Batt et al. (2008) found a 44% failure in their standard administration group of 60 
people with severe injuries, and a 75% failure rate in people with severe brain injuries when 
they were distracted. The findings of the current study are not as large as those found in people 
with ‘obvious’ symptoms in the Merten et al. (2006) study or Batt et al. (2008). This indicates 
that the sample in this research may be less impaired, and Batt et al (2008) state that all of their 
brain injured participants met the Merten study criteria for obvious symptoms; specifically, 
bradyphrenia, repetitive speech and word finding difficulties. Whereas some participants across 
all three of the subgroups used in the current research would not have met these criteria, 
particularly in the Epilepsy subgroup. However, the failure rates in the current study still 
indicate a significant increase from that predicted by Green (2003).
In the only other UK study with brain injured participants, the retrospective research by 
Bunnage et al. (2008) found an overall failure rate of 25.8% on the WMT-IR, 9% of which had 
a potential external incentive such as benefits, work absence or compensation claims. The rate 
of 25.8% is in line with the current finding of 21.3%, although it is likely that with such a wide 
definition of external incentive a significant proportion of the current sample would be 
identified as such. This is discussed further in the limitations section.
In an epilepsy sample, Drane et al. (2006) found an 8.1% failure rate on the WMT, whereas 
Dodrill (2008) found a rate of 25%. However, despite the current study identifying failure rates 
of 18.8% in this subgroup, there are differences in selection criteria between the participants in 
the current study and that of Dodrill (2008). It is likely that the current research reflects the strict 
criteria used by Drane et al. (2006), that is, excluding people who could not live independently 
or those with cognitive deficits, and thereby reducing the potential for failures based on genuine 
impairment. A choice was made in the current research regarding subgroup membership despite 
the clear comorbidity of brain damage, tumours and epilepsy across the whole clinical sample. It 
is likely that a number of the Community participants in the current research could equally be 
judged as fitting the Epilepsy group when using the more relaxed criteria of Dodrill (2008). This 
would likely increase the failure rates of people with epilepsy observed in the current research 
in line with that observed in the Dodrill (2008) study.
This study used other tests in addition to the WMT. Again, the failure rates for these tasks are 
higher than expected based on the rates suggested in other research, ranging from 2.8% to
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38.9%. For example, regarding the Digit Symbol-Coding task, Inman and Berry (2002) found a 
mean of 11.9 (S.D = 1.45) and no failures in participants with genuine brain injuries when using 
the cut-off scaled score of <5. However, all of these participants were enrolled at university and 
are therefore likely to be functioning at much higher levels than the participants in the current 
research.
The cut-off score of <8.5 for the Coin-In-Hand test identified in the work of Kelly et al. (2005) 
was derived from research that included 40 brain injured participants. This cut-off performed 
well when applied to the people participating in the current research. However, Kelly et al. 
(2005) also established the cut-off of <13.5 for the Mental Control test and <10.5 for the 
Autobiographical Memory Index based on the same research. Despite the mean for the overall 
sample in the current research being above the cut-off for the Mental Control test (M = 19.1; 
S.D = 7.3) nine participants still fell below the cut-off (25%). A large proportion of the 
Community participants (14/18 who completed) also failed the AMI at the proposed cut-off. 
Although no participants in the current study scored less than eight on this measure. It is 
possible that the participants in the Kelly et al. (2005) study were less impaired than those in the 
current research, as they were described as having attended a head injury rehabilitation service, 
so they may have performed better overall compared to people currently still in rehabilitation 
services. Further suggestions for the high failure rates observed on both the Mental Control test 
and the Autobiographical Memory Index are discussed in section 4.3 below.
Overall, the rates of failure on the WMT identified in the current research are more consistent 
with the levels of failure found in independent studies using the same measures than the levels 
of failure identified in research from the authors and associates. Failure rates across most of the 
additional effort tests are also higher than with other studies. The evidence provided in the 
current research raises significant questions regarding the suitability of the WMT for use with 
participants with a brain injury severe enough to require community rehabilitation services, 
patients with newly acquired injuries currently in a post-acute inpatient rehabilitation ward, and 
people with intractable epilepsy, even though Green (2003) states that “using the 82.5% cut-off, 
there will be very few false positives indeed, even in cases of severe traumatic brain injury and 
neurological disease” (p. 16).
This study also suggests potential differences in the reasons why specific subgroups within an 
overarching genuine brain injury population and no incentives to feign may perform poorly on 
effort tests. Although the number of participants recruited to the study is relatively large when 
considered as a genuine clinical sample, further research is required to establish the reliability of 
these findings through investigating subgroups. This would increase the statistical power of the 
research through the acquisition of larger and more homogenous samples. As it is, the findings
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suggest potential differences between subgroups, but a lack of power prevents the results being 
more than just exploratory in nature. Additional research could focus on recruiting greater 
numbers of participants within the individual subgroups, which may help to draw firmer 
conclusions based on comparisons. It also remains to be identified whether such results can be 
replicated and extended to people with less severe brain injuries/epilepsy. Failure to continue 
research into purported measures of effort could result in serious consequences for participants 
if they are judged to be feigning rather than understood as a false positive. The current findings 
suggest that despite the high sensitivity rates of measures such as the WMT, the specificity rate 
is unacceptable in people with genuine brain injuries.
4.3 Factors Contributing to Effort Test Scores
Failure rates on the Mental Control test were found to be related to depression scores; with 
62.5% of those who reached the clinical cut-off for depression failing this test compared to only 
15.4% of those who scored below the cut-off. Poor Mental Control scores were also 
significantly associated with lower scores on the processing speed task. Several other variables 
were correlated with lower scaled scores on the Mental Control test, including fewer years of 
education, lower pre-morbid IQ, and higher anxiety. None of these are surprising given that the 
test is based on over-learned information from childhood and the concomitant anxiety that 
usually accompanies depression.
Slowed mental processing is recognised as a key symptom of depression (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). The timed tests on the WAIS have been shown to be more sensitive to such 
slowed processing (Pemicano, 1986) and Gorlyn, Keilp, Oquendo, Burke, Sackeim, and Mann 
(2006) have recently shown that depression is related to the timed tasks targeting processing 
speed on the WAIS-III. This supports the identified relationship between depression, speed of 
processing and the Mental Control task found in the current research; the Mental Control task in 
the current study could be measuring speed of processing at impaired levels rather than effort
Lower scores on the Digit Symbol-Coding test was also found to be related to lower scores on 
speed of processing, and again this is an expected finding considering that this test in its usual 
role mainly identifies difficulties in speed of processing, with a smaller contribution for memory 
(Joy, Kaplan, & Fein, 2004). Therefore, the results noted in the current research indicate that 
failures on this test at the cut-offs provided for measuring effort could in fact be measuring 
processing speed in this sample. Overall, it appears that both the Mental Control and the Digit- 
Symbol Coding tests are simply too sensitive to genuine disorders in the current population, 
likely because they were developed specifically to encompass all levels of genuinely testable
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impairment. For example, Epilepsy Participant 9 within the individual analyses section failed 
both of these tests and also performed poorly on the processing speed task.
It is not disputed that people with moderate-severe brain injuries would do poorly on the Mental 
Control and Digit Symbol-Coding tasks, rather it is suggested that people with mild injuries not 
putting in enough effort would also do poorly for reasons of poor effort rather than genuine 
impairment. The results from the current study suggest that the Mental Control and Digit- 
Symbol Coding tasks are very sensitive to genuine impairment. Therefore, passing these tests at 
the standardised effort cut-offs indicates that the person is not very impaired, but failing the tests 
is less informative. It is also surprising that failures on the WMT-IR and WMT-DR are in line 
with failure rates on these other measures, particularly as these other tests were initially 
designed to identify severe impairments rather than effort
Failure on the Coin-In-Hand test was uncommon in the current study, supporting the 
proposition that this is an extremely simple task (Kapur, 1994) with very high specificity rates, 
although sensitivity is likely to be much reduced as a result. As reported in the individual 
analyses, the one person who did fail was likely due to a social desirability response style 
(Rogers, 2008a) rather than genuine impairment. The high failure rate for the Autobiographical 
Memory Index was a surprise finding because the measure was previously designed as a very 
simple effort test that is insensitive to injury (Wiggins & Brandt, 1988). It is possible that this 
could be due to changes in the applicability of the questions. For example, when considering 
the increase in mobile phone use and the concomitant reduction of people who no longer need to 
remember their telephone number, this question may now need to be revised. The Community 
participants were also staying in community residential housing, with some of them only just 
moving into the homes they were residing in and they often had their evening meal prepared for 
them. Therefore, failure to provide their full address or information regarding the food they had 
eaten the day before is also not surprising given the impaired memory of this sample and the 
instability of their housing situation. Future research could evaluate the performance of the AMI 
in genuinely brain injured participants when these questions have been removed or substituted. 
The current research suggests that a revised cut-off score of <8 may need to be applied in this 
population. The Camden Memory Test for Faces was also found to be related to some of the 
WMT-memory measures and scores on the AMI, again indicating that the results from this test 
could also be measuring memory in this population rather than a lack of effort.
No major relationships were identified between most of the demographic, injury, psychological 
or independent neuropsychological variables for failure rates across the WMT effort measures. 
A small correlation was found between the WMT-IR and age, with people who were younger 
scoring lower on this effort test (rho=-.304) and between WMT-DR and lower processing speed
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(r=.377). However, these findings did not remain significant once the Bonferroni correction was 
applied, and the main remaining relationships were actually identified within the WMT memory 
measures themselves.
According to Green (2003), people should score well above the cut-off scores on the WMT 
effort test measures; “there is a strong ceiling effect on the WMT effort measures” (p. 34) and 
therefore scores should be relatively consistent across the Immediate and Delayed tasks. The 
findings in the current research suggest that lower scores on the WMT effort measures are 
significantly related to the WMT memory measures; indicating that a relationship exists 
between memory and effort tests in the current sample of people with genuine brain injuries and 
no incentive to feign. However, these findings are limited by the fact that the memory measures 
are taken from the WMT, and as such no separate test of memory function independent of the 
WMT was taken. Future research could attempt to establish the pattern identified in the current 
findings through the administration of independent tests of memory. Regardless, on the basis of 
the current research, clinicians do need to be aware of the potential for low scores on the effort 
components of the WMT if the patient has particularly poor memory.
Significant relationships between failure rates on the WMT-Immediate Recognition trial and 
low memory scores on the WMT-Multiple Choice test and WMT-Paired Associates were 
identified, and the relationship with the WMT-Free Recall test approached significance. Overall, 
those who failed the WMT-IR scored in the lower group on the memory measures of the WMT, 
and this trend was also observed for the WMT-DR, but did not reach significance. When 
analyses were based on scaled scores statistically significant relationships were also identified. 
Participants in the WMT-Multiple Choice low score group had significantly lower scores on the 
Immediate and Delayed Recognition trials of the WMT, and this was also supported by 
correlations. Although the significant relationships were not consistent across the WMT-IR or 
WMT-DR, nor across the different types of WMT memory measures, the fact that significant 
relationships exist between the scores could indicate that the WMT effort measures are also 
measuring some element of memory in the population under investigation. The consistency of 
the WMT profile across all of the subtest scores, with lower scores on one relating to lower 
scores on the others, therefore provides an indication that the participants in the current research 
could have failed due to severity of cognitive impairments rather than insufficient effort. The 
individual analyses provide examples of this, as low memory scores are observed alongside 
lowered WMT effort scores. For example, Community Participant 3 failed the WMT-IR, 
received a caution on the WMT-DR, and then went on to obtain scores ranging from 15 to 35 
out of 100 on the WMT memory measures.
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As previously suggested, if Mental Control and Digit-Symbol Coding are actually measuring 
processing speed, whilst Camden and AMI are measuring memory in this study, then the 
finding that the WMT-IR is related to several of these measures (WMT-DR, MC, AMI, CMTF) 
cannot be interpreted as supportive of solely measuring effort. There was also inconsistency 
within the identified relationships across the tests, which also provides and indication of 
differential rates of specificity for these tests within the current subgroups. It is also interesting 
that the Immediate and Delayed Recognition trials of the WMT display differing relationships 
regarding the other effort tests. Both measures are derived from the same test and very 
obviously linked with regard to content and structure. In addition, validation research suggests 
that both tests are measuring effort, with scores at ceiling levels in genuine participants with no 
incentive to feign. Therefore, the differences in relationships with other tests within the current 
research could suggest that other factors are affecting the performance of the WMT-IR and the 
WMT-DR in different ways. It may be that these measures have differential sensitivity to 
impairment and effort in populations such as those involved in the current study, with the delay 
in administration of the WMT-DR being an obvious choice for further investigation.
The current research suggests all of the effort measures apart from the Coin-In-Hand test are 
sensitive to genuine brain impairment, and as such are not suitable for identifying poor effort in 
these populations. It is not clear why the participants performed so poorly when compared to the 
participants discussed in the WMT manual. As Green (2003) states that “there are very few 
“false positives”, with the exception of people with dementia” (p. 9). It is surprising to find that 
a genuine clinical sample of people with brain injuries and no incentive to feign failed the WMT 
and other effort tests at such significant rates. However, it is possible that the patients assessed 
in the current research had more severe impairments than those assessed as part of the validation 
research. For example, the differences may be related to variation in classification, as it is not 
entirely clear what Green (2003) means by ‘profound’ impairment, and if a more stringent 
assessment of such deficits was applied then such failure rates may also have been found in the 
validation studies. In addition, Green (2003) states that if a patient “needs constant care, has a 
definite brain disease, has an abnormal brain scan and is not allowed to drive” (p. 42) then the 
possibility that the scores are the result of a false positive should be considered. It is noted that 
the vast majority of Inpatient and Community participants were within 24 hour services, 
although these services were ‘rehabilitation’ rather than ‘care’ and most participants did not 
require ‘constant’ supervision. Furthermore, Green (2003) does repeatedly point out that even 
people with ‘severe’ impairments can pass the WMT, and in relation to false positives “in the 
first 1,000 cases given the WMT clinically by Green, it is thought that there were only about 
five cases of this type” (p. 42). However, it is very important to assess such populations with 
regard to their performance on the WMT, as many of the Community participants had been
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through the litigation process and it is likely that a proportion of the Inpatient’sample will be 
expected to go through this process in the future.
4.3.1 Additional explanations for the current findings
One alternative explanation is that the participants identified in the current study were in fact 
feigning or exaggerating their symptoms. Some studies support the view that malingering is 
present in people who have genuine injuries (e.g. Bianchini, Greve, & Love, 2003; Trueblood & 
Schmidt, 1993) even when they are severe (Boone & Lu, 2003). Therefore, one explanation for 
the observed rates may be that the participants in the current research were deliberately not 
putting in effort, or that a psychiatric condition was compounding their performance.
However, it seems unlikely that the participants in this study were malingering, as there were no 
clear incentives for them to do so and no psychiatric conditions were noted that would have 
precluded administration of the tests on such grounds. Green (2003) also does not report any 
more information about his ‘genuine’ brain injured participants other than that they are assumed 
to be putting in appropriate effort by the very fact that they have observable injuries on brain 
scans, are ‘obviously’ impaired, and have already been awarded disability benefits. Therefore, 
the participants in the current study matched the validation sample on this basis, and could 
therefore be assumed as putting in adequate effort based on these criteria.
All participants also went through a lengthy consent process with consultants and care workers; 
participating in this research was entirely voluntary and they could withdraw at any time, so if 
anyone was genuinely malingering it is likely that they would have refused. However, the 
refusal rate was low, particularly with the most impaired groups (Community and Inpatient), 
and these subgroups were also the ones who showed most interest in taking part, reporting that 
they were often bored during the day and were glad of something to do. In addition, it is 
difficult to imagine anyone faking a brain injury as a result of wanting community rehabilitation 
or inpatient admission, or that the severity levels of such injuries could be consistently 
replicated enough to deceive professionals in such institutions. All of the participants within the 
Community and Epilepsy groups had also already been through litigation and/or benefits claims. 
However, it could also be that the participants were not motivated to perform well on tests based 
on the fact that it was research rather than an assessment that would benefit them.
It would be useful to conduct a study in which participants with genuine injuries similar to those 
observed in the current research were provided with an incentive to identify whether failure 
rates reduced under these conditions. Future research could also consider the inclusion of 
simulators or suspected malingerers so that sensitivity and predictive power could be assessed.
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This study highlights that additional research is needed to investigate the psychometric 
properties of the effort measures, particularly when using clinical samples, to help improve the 
diagnostic utility of the measures.
When considering magnitude of error, no true malingering was evident (i.e. below chance 
performance) even though some people did do worse than others. The WMT also counts as a 
‘floor effect’ detection strategy because it is supposed to be a simple test that can be completed 
by most impaired people. However, as this research has shown, the test may not be as infallible 
as previously claimed. The WMT also counts as a ‘violation of learning principles’ detection 
strategy, but it is limited because it is only applicable to the current learning during the WMT 
and other factors may be contributing to the results. For example, in the current study a number 
of participants scored higher on the Delayed Recognition component of the WMT compared to 
the Immediate Recognition trial, but this could just be because of speed of processing 
difficulties. Due to the similar rates across the WMT-IR and WMT-DR, it is also likely that the 
findings of higher scores were an artefact, as the differences between the scores were only 
modest
Despite Green (2003) stating that “the recognition subtests were designed to avoid confusing 
actual impairment with deliberate exaggeration” (p. 6), it is also possible that some participants 
were unable to perform well on effort tests for other reasons. As Bunnage et al. (2008) point out, 
clinicians may not know what all the possible secondary gains are in this situation. As outlined 
by Rogers (2008a), people may fail effort tests due to a variety of different response styles, and 
such styles vary depending on context. Rogers (2008a) also states that there are both internal 
and external influences on reporting, but points out that there are no standardised measures to 
assess these idiosyncratic factors. The examinees in clinical settings may view dissimulation as 
adaptive and positive, including maintaining autonomy, avoiding difficult circumstances, 
disengaging from an involuntary process, maintaining a sense of worth, or minimising avoidable 
pain. In addition, it is possible that the researcher being young and female produced increased 
levels of Impression Management than a middle aged man would within a population of young 
brain-injured men.
As highlighted in the individual analyses section, clinical observations from the current research 
suggest factors such as medication and impression management could play a role (Lishman, 
1997; Rogers, 2008a). For example, Community participant 1 showed marked bradyphrenia and 
was known to be on high doses of medication thought to be affecting her daily functioning, and 
Epilepsy Participants 8 and 10 were both young men who seemed to be embarrassed by their 
current situation and problems. This highlights the importance of considering personal internal 
and external factors when anyone obtains a low score on effort tests, and clinicians must think
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through the alternatives for poor test performance in addition to malingering. Future research 
could attempt to assess alternative response styles in more detail in order to establish the extent 
of their influence on tests purported to measure effort.
Another potential reason for the differences in failure rates identified between the effort tests 
and across subgroups is the different presentation and testing structures of each test. For 
example, Batt et al. (2008) suggest differences in failure rates across the WMT and TOMM 
could be due to differences in the stimulus material, as the WMT uses semantically related 
words, which could create confusion and more errors due to ‘semantic interference’ (Wehner, 
Ahlfors, & Mody. 2007) even if they are applying their full effort. During the WMT people are 
presented with two words that belong to the same category and strongly related to one another. 
If a participant cannot remember the exact word then they may remember the general category, 
but struggle when faced with a choice between two very similar words, (e.g., ‘fire’ versus 
‘flame'). Such effects of semantic memory are well documented even in healthy populations 
when using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott. 1995). 
This paradigm involves presenting participants with lists of semantically associated words (e.g. 
fire, flame, sun. warm and so on) that are all related to a non-presented target theme or related 
lure (e.g. hot). Healthy participants frequently intrude the related lure on free recall tests and 
have high levels of false identification of these words on recognition tests.
When assessing people with amnesia based on a modified DRM paradigm, research by 
Schacter. Verfaellie, Anes and Racine (1998) found that whereas control participants had 
decreasing levels of false recognition over successive trials the amnesic participants showed no 
such pattern. Schacter et al. (1998) proposed that this was a result of true and false recognition 
being dependent upon different t>pes of information, including item-specific recollection based 
on a previous encounter with an item, and the general gist or meaning gained from a collection 
of items. Therefore, gist representations are developed which are experienced as recollection or 
familiarity when a studied item or a related lure is presented in later recognition tests.
Based on research suggesting that frontal lobe damage appears to be associated with higher rates 
of false recognition (Parkin. Bindschaedler. Harsent. & Metzler. 1996). impaired item-specific 
memory (Parkin. Ward, Bindschaedler, Squires, & Powell, 1999) and source memory confusion 
(Janowsky, Shimamura. & Squire, 1989). Budson. Sullivan. Mayer, Daffner, Black and 
Schacter (2002) applied the DRM paradigm to people with frontal lobe lesions. They found that 
unlike controls, patients with frontal lesions could not reduce their rates of false recognition 
across successive trials. Budson et al. (2002) suggest that repeated presentation produces a more 
robust gist-based semantic representation, leading to high rates of false recognition because of 
poor item-specific recollection. Anterior prefrontal regions have been identified as involved in
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post-retrieval monitoring and verification (Rugg. Fletcher, Firth. Frackowiak. & Dolan, 1996). 
which would be needed to use item-specific information to suppress false recognition. However, 
if there is damage to source monitoring and verification-inhibition mechanisms located in the 
frontal lobes it may mean that patients are unable to use increasing explicit recollection to 
counteract or suppress the developing gist representations.
Batt et al. (2008) also suggest that if the resulting brain injury has affected the ability to monitor 
performance and learn from feedback then this could also contribute to test results. These 
suggestions are consistent with the notion that more anterior or widespread damage could be 
contributing to scores on the WMT in the current research despite no significant differences 
being identified due to a lack of statistical power. For example, in their study of people with 
Schizophrenia, Gorissen et al. (2005) point out that people may fail effort tests because of an 
inability to monitor their performance and correct for waning attention, which is consistent with 
an executive syndrome. It has been established that people with frontal brain injuries find it 
more difficult to sustain their attention, inhibit responses, and become frustrated more easily 
(Wood. 2002). The individual analyses support these views, as it was observed that some 
participants found the feedback on the WMT distracting, plus the nature of the injuries 
necessary to warrant community rehabilitation suggests that monitoring performance and 
learning from feedback is particularly difficult for the Community subgroup. In addition, 
individual question analyses of the WMT indicated semantic relatedness effects within the 
incorrect answers. For example, Community participant 2 was able to correctly identify fire 
from ‘fire/flame’ on the Immediate Recognition trial of the WMT, but failed to identify fire 
from ‘fire/smoke’ on the Delayed Recognition trial; this continued with the Multiple Choice 
memory measure, where ‘smoke’ was chosen, and with Paired Associates, where ‘alarm’ was 
chosen. It is possible that the participant developed a gist based representation that was able to 
be overridden during the Immediate Recognition trial, but once specific-item recollection had 
deteriorated then the gist representation could not be inhibited and false recognition occurred. 
Future research could establish just how common this finding is on the WMT in people who 
have frontal lobe lesions.
The results from the Inpatient sample also suggest that being able to maintain attention and 
concentration is a significant factor in performing well on tests of effort, whereas failures in the 
Epilepsy subgroup seemed to originate from younger men struggling with their current 
circumstances, with a flatness of affect that could belie lack of interest or identity management 
rather than purely anxiety or depression.
Research suggests that divided attention and distraction interferes with encoding and ability to 
complete tasks (Schmitter-Edgecombe & Nissley, 2000; Watt, Shores. & Kinoshita. 1999), and
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this is particularly pronounced in people with a brain injun- due to an increased inability to 
inhibit distractions (Knight, Titov & Crawford. 2006). Batt et al. (2008) showed that 
performance on the WMT is affected by distraction, and conclude that the WMT is thus 
measuring ability as well as effort. This is not consistent with the view that the WMT requires 
effort, but little or no ‘ability’ (Green et al., 2002). Batt et al. (2008) also found a relationship 
with pre-morbid intelligence, but the current research was unable to establish a difference in 
pre-morbid IQ between those who passed and failed effort tests. However, several of the 
participant's pre-morbid IQ scores could not be calculated. Despite the numerous measures 
included in the current study, a significant drawback was the lack of any thorough 
neuropsychological data such as current intelligence and memory functioning. It could therefore 
be that failure rates within the current research are an accurate reflection of those identified by 
Dean et al. (2008), who found that the cut-offs on some widely used effort tests are 
inappropriate for people with low IQ levels. Ideally, future research will assess current IQ levels 
to more thoroughly investigate the suggestion that WMT results are influenced by cognitive 
ability.
Green et al. (2001) imply that effort has such a large effect that it “literally inverts” (p. 1059) the 
patterns of scores expected on the basis severity of injury. Therefore, the authors state that 
mildly injured patients are supposed to do worse than more severely injured patients when 
secondary gains are present and perform at the same level when they are not. Although no 
formal severity rating was calculated in the current research the participant subgroups are 
assumed to differ in the severity of their injuries. With regard to the WMT, participants in the 
Epilepsy group scored higher than the Community and Inpatient participants on the WMT-IR 
and WMT-DR, although this did not reach significance. However, statistically significant 
differences were found with regard to the AMI and the CMTF, with Community participants 
failing these tests at much higher rates than the Epilepsy participants. Such findings provide an 
indication that people with more severe or more recent brain injuries may fail some effort tests 
at higher rates than people with milder injuries when no secondary gains are present.
Demographic and psychological differences across subgroups of participants could also 
contribute to variability in effort test scores. For example, the participants in the Epilepsy 
sample were significantly younger, more anxious, and had better memory scores than the 
participants in the Community group. 23.4% of the overall sample were above the cut-off for 
anxiety and 36.2% were above the cut-off for depression. However, subgroup analyses revealed 
that 62.5% of the Epilepsy sample were anxious and 21.1% were depressed, compared to 
anxiety levels of 20% and depression levels of 15% in the Community and levels of 27.3% for 
both anxiety and depression in Inpatients. It is unclear why the participants with Epilepsy were 
so much more anxious than the other two subgroups, although most of the Epilepsy participants
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were undergoing continued monitoring in anticipation of receiving surgery in the near future. 
There were also more men than women in the research. However, this is representative of the 
finding that more men experience brain injuries than women, with 70-88% of all people that 
sustain a head injury being male (Department of Health, 2001), so it is unlikely that such a 
finding is contributing to rates of failure on the effort tests.
4.4 Clinical Implications of the Study Findings
The findings from the current research have a number of implications in relation to the clinical 
assessment and management of people with brain injuries. Specifically, such results suggest 
that:
■ Clinicians need to be wary of interpreting the results of failures on effort tests as evidence 
of feigning in the populations identified in this study.
■ Although the precise contribution of other factors in addition to effort is unclear, the current 
research suggests that anterior brain lesions could be contributing to failure rates in this 
population, along with ability to sustain attention, and other response styles suggested by 
Rogers (2008a) such as impression management. Memory, processing speed and depression 
were also linked to some of the effort test scores. Therefore, there are certain factors that 
may warrant further investigation if effort test failure is observed in clinical practice, 
particularly processing speed, neurobehavioural presentation, and response styles.
■ Clinicians need to carefully consider whether failure on effort tests is due to brain damage 
or poor effort. If the patient fails effort tests due to insufficient effort then scores on other 
neuropsychological tests would be invalid, but if the patient fails due to brain damage then 
the scores on other tests would be an accurate reflection of abilities. It appears that when 
interpreting any test of effort, full consideration should be given to the cognitive abilities 
that may be involved, such as memory, attention, and language, and to the context of 
assessment, such as external incentives, consistency of reports, observations and 
behaviours.
■ In line with both the Slick et al. (1999) criteria and the NAN guidelines, this research 
highlights the importance of clinicians not relying on the results of just one effort test when 
assessing effort within clinical settings, and consideration must be given to performance of 
multiple effort tests within populations similar to those assessed in the current research in 
order to increase specificity.
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■ The cut-off scores may need to be adjusted for the effort measures used in the current 
research in order to increase specificity. For example, scores of <8 on the AMI produce a 
specificity rate of 100% in this population. However, even if the cut-off scores are adjusted 
to increase specificity and avoid the possibility of false positives, this means that sensitivity 
would reduce and people who do not have a credible performance would be less likely to be 
identified.
■ Clinicians need to place a greater emphasis on explaining the importance of testing from the 
client’s perspective so that they are more invested in and focussed on the process, as 
clinicians may be significantly overestimating how interested or motivated clinical patients 
are during assessment.
■ Notwithstanding the indication that brain damage may affect performance on the WMT in a 
severely brain-injured population, the WMT probably remains a valid measure of effort in 
people with much milder injuries. Therefore if people with much milder injuries were 
scoring below the levels obtained in this study then there would be questions raised 
regarding their performance. As a result, passing or failing such effort tests could also have 
implications for treatment and rehabilitation, as those who perform poorly on 
neuropsychological tests despite passing effort tests may require different rehabilitation 
strategies than those who perform at the same cognitive level, but fail effort tests.
Although effort tests may not be as effective as first thought at evaluating patients with 
legitimate brain injuries, it is still important for clinicians to recognise the impact that reduced 
effort can have and must consider ways of assessing it within their practice. McCarter et al 
(2009) revealed that lots of clinicians within the UK are not including such measures in their 
assessments. For example, 26% indicated that they did not use tests in clinical samples due to 
the perceived low base rate, and 11% reported using their own idiosyncratic methods and 
unpublished tests. Both of these are potentially dangerous situations, as this research has 
already indicated that even supposedly well validated tests do not have the required evidence 
available to unequivocally support their use in all populations, and idiosyncratic methods could 
be even more flawed. In addition, despite the perceived low base rate of reduced effort in 
clinical samples, knowing whether someone is able to put in their best effort is vital for 
understanding the results of all other tests.
4.5 Limitations of the Study
Whilst the research does have some notable strengths, a number of weaknesses can also be 
identified that are outlined in the next section.
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4.5.1 Design considerations
A factor that could have affected the results of the current research is the different environments 
that testing took place in. Administration was carried out within hospital wards, in hospital 
clinics, in people’s own homes, and in community supported housing, as well as being at 
different times of day. Therefore, a number of extraneous factors could have affected the results. 
For example, the hospital ward was often noisier than the outpatient clinic, and considering that 
the Inpatient participants had newly acquired injuries that would increase their distractibility, 
they would have potentially found assessment more difficult than they would have if testing was 
in a quieter environment. However, the current research attempted to keep such extraneous 
factors to a minimum through administering tests in a quiet room away from the main ward.
The chief investigator was not blinded to study hypotheses and methodology and administered 
all tests, and this may have unduly influenced participant responses. However, this helped to 
maintain consistency of assessment within the Epilepsy and Community subgroups, and ensured 
participants were provided with appropriate feedback if they were having difficulties with any 
of the procedures. In addition, testing directions were written down in detail and followed as 
closely as possible so all participants received the same guidance and prompts. However, the 
limited test administration within the Inpatient group is also a significant limitation of the study, 
as not all participants received the same tests and so consistency across administrations was not 
maintained.
The representativeness of the sample may also have influenced the results. Several subgroups of 
clinical populations with varying injuries were included in the study and analysed as an overall 
brain injury group. However, only three subgroup populations were recruited, and it is possible 
that if other populations were assessed (e.g. people with multiple sclerosis or those attending 
outpatient community rehabilitation) then the results of the current study could be different. 
However, it is likely that the population used in the current research was reasonably 
representative of people who have a head injury by the fact that they were drawn directly from 
clinical populations presenting to services.
In addition, due to the nature of the sample it was difficult to gain access to the required 
populations. Access to all patients required communication with consultants, ward managers 
and care workers. However, collaboration with staff was often the reason for failure to recruit, 
particularly from the Inpatient ward where staff found it difficult to find the time to identify 
suitable participants based on the relevant inclusion and exclusion criteria. Therefore, it is likely 
that consultants and staff varied in their judgements regarding who was suitable and who was
asked to participate. A further difficulty regarding the representativeness of the sample was that 
the ethics committee also required that patients be approached by someone they were already 
working with before being approached by the researcher. This was to minimise any potential 
undue pressure to take part, but did reduce the number of participants contacted. There were 
also some refusals to take part across all subgroups of participants, and it is possible that those 
who refused were different in some way from the population who were assessed. However, 
people who did not wish to take part in the research were limited, and those who did refuse 
mainly gave reasons associated with being too busy. This is reflected in the Epilepsy sample, 
who were generally living independently and had work commitments, and they refused at higher 
rates than the other subgroups.
As mentioned previously, based on Green’s (2003) descriptions it is difficult to know if the 
population studied in the current research matched that of the genuinely brain injured sample 
used to validate the WMT. It is hard to isolate scores within the WMT manual, as the studies 
often use a differential prevalence design to identify people who pass and fail during litigation, 
and then analyse the differences between these samples on a post-hoc basis. In addition, the 
definite brain injury group in the validation research had reported Post-Traumatic Amnesia of
16.4 days (S.D = 24). However, it was not possible to identify such scores for the current 
sample and it could be that the participants in the current research were much more impaired. It 
would be very useful to identify PTA and GCS levels in any future studies so that severity 
levels across various studies can be compared.
The nature of brain injury and location of brain injury were also difficult variables to assign 
participants to for a variety of reasons. Specifically, there are problems with the comorbidity of 
brain injuries with epilepsy, epilepsy surgery and tumour surgery. Also, the information 
available regarding the location of injury was variable, as the Community subgroup notes were 
not as detailed as the Inpatient and Epilepsy groups. Specific location of injury was also more 
likely to be recorded in the Epilepsy subgroup because the origin of seizures is more specific 
(i.e. left or right temporal lobe), whereas people with traumatic brain injuries are more likely to 
have widespread or diffuse damage with specific regions highlighted for consideration 
depending on brain scans and behavioural presentation (i.e. anterior brain lesions). For example, 
within the individual analyses section Community Participant 1 had reports of more general 
injuries including ‘widespread atrophy’, whereas Epilepsy Participant 8 had more focussed 
information regarding injury, specifically a tumour in the right temporal lobe.
The order of the tests was not counterbalanced in the current study because in research 
involving correlations it is best to standardise the order. Order of test administration can 
influence results (e.g. through fatigue or boredom), but randomising the order means that this
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variance is spread across the tasks so it is not clear where it lies, and in the current research 
counterbalancing may have masked the relationships that the research was interested in 
identifying. The standardised order could have influenced the results such as those for the 
Camden memory Test for Faces because this measure was administered last and therefore the 
risk of fatigue or boredom could have been increased. It may be that the inclusion of lots of 
measures within the same testing session was overwhelming, particularly for the Community 
participants. However, this is unlikely to have influenced WMT scores because the test is 
specifically designed with a half hour gap between administrations that is usually filled with 
other tests during a standard assessment in medico-legal settings. It would make the test highly 
impractical if clinicians were not able to administer further tests within this time frame. The 
Inpatient participants also had a break between the two WMT effort test administrations in 
which no other tests were performed, so testing fatigue is unlikely to account for the findings in 
this subgroup.
4.5.2 Testing considerations
An advantage of having one researcher assess all of the participants included in the research was 
that any difficulties with the measures were highlighted. For example, despite being preset to a 
volume judged to be reasonable by the researcher the WMT feedback noise was very off-putting 
for some of the participants and the volume was turned to a barely audible level after 
administration to the first few participants. Although this provides clinically relevant 
information about the participants it could also have affected the results, and it is possible that 
turning the feedback noise off altogether may influence the findings in patients who were 
already distractible and easily frustrated.
As previously reported, it is possible that questions included on measures such as the AMI have 
meant that the measure itself has changed in utility over time. For example, technology has 
advanced to act as an aid for people’s impaired memory, and people are now more reliant on 
mobile telephones to store and access numbers that they would once have needed to remember. 
Also, only one short questionnaire measure was used to identify anxiety and depression in the 
current sample, and this indicated significantly high rates. It is possible that a more in depth 
analysis of these factors could change the nature of the relationship with effort test scores.
The Brief Effort Questionnaire included at the end of the research was also affected by the 
nature of participant injuries. It was clear that a number of the participants were not sure what 
‘effort’ meant, and so required additional instructions such as ‘trying your best’. As the 
construct of ‘effort’ is not clear cut for participants or for researchers the answers to these 
questions were likely based on different concepts for different participants. As clinicians need to
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ensure that patients put in their best effort during testing it would be useful to find out what 
patients actually understand by this term. This could help to provide clearer and more 
straightforward ways to explain the importance of effort to participants before testing begins.
Although the current study included a variety of measures of effort, the additional effort tests 
used to assist in the evaluation of construct validity are also not considered to be amongst the 
most sensitive or specific (McCarter et al. 2009). It would be interesting to evaluate effort test 
performance in this group with another effort measure that has received equal research and 
publicity, such as the TOMM (Tombaugh, 1996).
Finally, people with brain injuries often have other co-morbid conditions. For example, people 
with brain injuries are known to experience higher levels of fatigue. Testing was monitored and 
adapted to account for this where necessary, but an objective measure of such variables was not 
taken and therefore it is not clear if it affected the results obtained from effort tests. However, 
the participants were drawn from genuine clinical populations, so any effect of factors such as 
fatigue is likely to be representative of people with brain injuries similar to those observed in the 
participants recruited to this study.
4.5.3 Statistical analyses
While most of the data conformed to the statistical assumptions required for the tests conducted 
on the data, some variables were identified as not normally distributed, some variables could not 
be used in analyses due to ceiling effects (i.e. Coin-in Hand test), some variables could not be 
used in particular analyses due to the nature of the data (e.g. ordinal scales with too few 
categories), and data for some variables was not collected for the Inpatient sample.
It is interesting to note that WMT-IR was not normally distributed, but the WMT-DR was. Such 
a finding indicates variability in these measures, as the assumption would be for both to be non­
normal ly distributed and all participants to score near ceiling levels. As Green et al. (1999) point 
out, “Scores on the measures of biased responding on the WMT ... are not normally distributed; 
they show a strong ceiling effect because they are minimally sensitive to variations in ability.” 
(p. 816). However, the WMT-IR variable contained the two participants whose administrations 
were halted, and it is likely that it was these low scores that skewed the data. The distribution of 
scores across both the WMT-IR and WMT-DR indicate that something in addition to effort 
could be being measured within this particular population.
Within the analyses, although some significant relationships were identified between effort test 
scores and the additional variables included in the study, limited relationships were identified
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for the WMT. The patterns observed were in accordance with previous independent research 
conducted with the WMT, but they were not demonstrated statistically, with the exception of the 
WMT memory measures and small correlations with age and processing speed. Such a finding 
could support the view of the test authors, in that the WMT is actually measuring something 
other than genuine cognitive impairment, but it could also indicate that the WMT has limited 
range and is not a very sensitive measure. However, despite the relatively large sample size in 
the current study, it is still possible that it was simply too small to identify any relationships 
between variables. Although the sample was a genuine clinical population with no incentives to 
feign, the subgroups within this population may have different reasons for failing the tests, as 
indicated in the results section containing individual analyses. The Inpatient participants were 
also not administered several of the additional measures required to draw conclusions about 
performance (e.g. processing speed and memory). Therefore there may not have been enough 
participants in the subgroups or across particular variables.
Some of the findings in the research were also based on different types of analyses. Initial 
pass/fail rates across effort tests were judged the most suitable data to consider in relation to the 
other variables, but scaled scores were also used to identify any potential relationships, 
particularly considering that the pass/fail rates appear unsuitable for use in the current 
population. Although this allowed the data to be thoroughly examined from different statistical 
perspectives, the conclusions drawn based on scaled scores are not directly applicable to 
‘failure’ rates as specified by standardised cut-offs. There is also a probability of Type I error 
due to all the indices evaluated. However, Bonferroni corrections were applied where 
appropriate within the statistical analyses, and the number of failures is still more than would be 
expected through chance alone given that the measures are designed not to be failed by people 
with genuine impairments.
4.6 Recommendations for Future Research
The vast majority of the literature conducted with people who have brain injuries has been with 
people within litigation. Many unanswered questions remain about the performance of effort 
tests across populations other than those in litigation, and to what extent such tests measure 
variables in addition to effort. There has been virtually no previous research to date focussing on 
independent evaluations of the WMT in genuinely impaired populations with no incentive to 
feign. Although the current research has provided some key insights into the levels of effort test 
failure within genuine brain injured populations, further psychometric validation is urgently 
required in larger and different clinical groups in order to fully establish whether the WMT is 
measuring what it is purported to measure and is accurately classifying clinical populations.
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Further research is also required to investigate performance on effort tests with larger samples 
of the subgroups assessed in the current study and in those where the severity of brain 
injuries/epilepsy has been more clearly established. Such research is vital to ensure that 
clinicians do not make a Type I error and conclude that a genuine patient is feigning when the 
results actually reflect a false positive. The current findings suggest that clinicians could be at 
risk of making such an error when using tests of effort with the populations assessed in the 
current research.
The current study also highlights the importance of administering multiple measures to assess 
effort, but it also shows that even multiple measures can potentially produce false positives. 
Further research could focus on developing cut-offs that are more suitable for use with people 
who have more severe brain injuries and cognitive impairments. There is also clinical utility in 
identifying those who struggle to perform well on these tests, as the very simple nature of the 
task would indicate that any people who fail for genuine reasons are unlikely to perform well on 
other neuropsychological tests.
Research including more comprehensive neuropsychological data will be of particular value 
when attempting to establish clear reasons for effort test failure. Longitudinal studies that collect 
comprehensive data over time would be a useful contribution. Retest performance on effort tests 
within genuine clinical populations would also be valuable to investigate, as pass and fail rates 
may vary over time. The current research has also only focussed on the assessment of tests 
based on feigning memory impairments. However, people are capable of feigning other 
symptoms within neuropsychological assessment, such as perceptual or motor difficulties (e.g. 
Greiffenstein, 2007). Future research will need to ensure that tests being developed to identify 
people who feign such difficulties are equally valid for use in people who have genuine 
impairments.
An increased focus on qualitative data such as that collated from the Brief Effort Questionnaire 
may also provide clearer information from a more subjective, patient perspective to inform 
clinicians of the reasons why people may not perform well on these tests. Further research could 
interview or administer questionnaires to genuine participants who have completed 
neuropsychological and effort testing to gather information regarding response styles during 
testing; this could provide information that standardised measures cannot. Further studies could 
also look in more detail at the structure of the WMT, as it seems plausible that people with 
frontal lesions may struggle on the WMT task as a result of the semantic relatedness of the test 
items. This would result in more false recognition of incorrect items for genuine reasons such as 
a failure to monitor their performance and inhibit responses.
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It is possible that some of the participants in the current study were not putting in their full effort 
even though the sample were screened for obvious external incentives to feign and were aware 
that the results were confidential. It could be that the continued receiving of benefits or care is 
enough. Therefore, some of the results could be true positives. Alternatively, it may be that 
clinicians are not fully aware of all the potential secondary gains, such as maintaining autonomy 
and a sense of identity or minimising avoidable pain. Future research into potential alternative 
response styles which could lead to failures on effort tests in addition to malingering will be 
very valuable within clinical settings, where any secondary gains or potential response styles are 
not as clearly identifiable.
4.7 Conclusions
Despite evidence to suggest that effort tests such as the WMT are measuring the amount of 
‘effort* an individual puts into a task rather than cognitive 'ability * this study has provided 
evidence that people with genuine brain injuries and no incentive to feign fail effort tests at 
much higher rates than previously suggested. Statistical analyses showed relationships between 
a number of the effort tests and various demographic, injury, psychological and 
neuropsychological variables. This supports the concept of effort test failure as multifaceted and 
potentially reliant on factors in addition to effort in populations such as those included in the 
current research. Whilst the exploratory- nature of the study cautions against over-interpretation 
of the results, this research does suggest that clinicians need to be wary when using established 
cut-off scores to interpret effort test data.
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Information about the Research
Y ou are  being invited to take  part in a research project. B efore you decide, it is 
im portant to understand why th e  study is being done and w hat is involved. 
P lease take a  m inute to read this brief inform ation sheet.
S tu d y  title :
M em ory Testing in Neurological Conditions 
W h a t is  th e  p u rp o s e  o f th e  s tu d y ?
People with neurological conditions som etim es have problem s with their 
m em ory and concentration. A  num ber o f new  assessm ents have been  
introduced to assess how serious these problem s are  and to identify w hether 
you a re  ab le  to put in your best effort during th e  assessm ents. H ow ever, very  
little work has been carried out looking a t how people with neurological 
conditions perform  on these new  m easures.
W e  are researching how people perform  so that w e can help doctors select the  
best tests for people a t d ifferent stages o f recovery.
W h y  have I b een  ch o sen ?
You have been invited because you have been identified by your doctor as  
having a  neurological condition. A  total o f 6 0  peop le will also be involved in the  
study.
W h a t w ill h ap p en  if I ta k e  p art?
If you do take  part then w e w ill ask you to try your best to  com plete som e tests  
o f m em ory and concentration. T h e  tests w ill take  2 0 -4 0  m inutes, w ith an  
additional break in the m iddle.
P lease note th a t the results o f the tests a re  strictly anonym ous and confidential. 
Your nam e will not be on the tests.
A ssessm ent can take  p lace a t C hapel A llerton Hospital or S t Jam es' Hospital in 
Leeds, or a t your hom e if m ore convenient. If you live a t hom e, but would prefer 
to com e to the hospital then you can receive travel expenses o f up to £10 .
A t the end of the study w e w ill p repare a  brief sum m ary o f th e  results. Th is will 
be availab le  if you would like to read it.
F u rth e r in fo rm a tio n :
P lease contact N atalie  Ham pson, Psychologist in Clinical Train ing, Leeds  
University. T e l: 0 1 13  34 3  2732
I l l
5.2 Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
Title  o f Project: M em ory Testing in N eurological Conditions 
N am e o f R esearcher: N atalie  Ham pson
P lease  m ark  b o x
1 . 1 confirm  th at I have read and understood the inform ation
sheet and this consent form . I have had the opportunity to ______
consider the inform ation, and ask questions.
2 . 1 understand th a t my participation is voluntary and I am  
free  to  w ithdraw  a t any tim e w ithout giving any reason, 
w ithout my m edical care  or legal rights being affected .
3 . 1 understand th a t any w ritten records w ill be used only for 
research and /or teaching purposes and that I w ill not be  
identified by nam e.
4 . 1 give perm ission form  my m edical records to be seen  by 
th e  m ain researcher, w ho is a  Psychologist in C linical 
Training.
5 . 1 ag ree  to take  part in the study.
N am e o f Participant D ate  S ignature
N am e o f R esearcher D ate S ignature
5.3 Recruitment Protocol
5.4 Protocol for Stopping the Assessment
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5.5 Additional Analyses
Table 30: T-test calculations between the current research and Green’s (2003) validation 
research
Study WMT-IR WMT-DR
T df Sig. T df Sig.
Moderate to severe brain injuries 
(N=57) vs current research (N=47) 3.94 102 p<02 2.87 65 p<.02
Neurological with impaired memory 
(N=20) vs current research (N=47) 2.73 65 p<.02 2.23 65 p<.03
Neurological with normal memory 
(N=20) vs current research (N=47) 2.76 65 p<02 2.94 65 p<.02
